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CHAPTER

I'

INTRODUCTORY
uThe history of humanism. u wrote the late Abbe/
Br~mond,.u has not yet been written. rt1 Indeed, we may venture
to add that humanism has never been accurately and adequately
defined.

No other word, perhaps, in our tongue is so rioh in

associations and yet so vaguely apprehended in its radical
and historical signification.
religious oonnotation as

At times it bears a mistily

designatir~

a mild apotheosis of man.

AgainJits import seems purely cultural, indicating the aultivation or possession of a oertain broadness of mind and
urbanity ot manner, evenJperhaps)the consoiousness of a certain worldly wisdom, and in this sense it is frequently opposed to the "scientific" attitnde of mind.

Most

oommon1~

however,its assooiation is literary, and this association is
sometimes so strong as practically to &quate the terms"humanist" and -litt'rateur."

The strict use of the word in this

last association links it most closely with the study of the
anoient olassios.

It is olear from this state of confusion

tha t the first task of the tu ture historian of humanism will
be to olarify these usages, and this ta.sk oan soaroe1y be
accomplished more safely and more suooesstul1y than by a

-
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oomparative examination of the dootrines and opinions of menJ
both of the past and of the present, to whom the title "humanist lf is generally given, or who themselves have olaimed the
designation.

Suoh a oomparative study, neoessarily on a mod-

est scale, is the aim of this essay.
·For the purposes of our investigation, the wJrks of
three men of widely different oulture to whom everyone will
readily oonoede the title of "humani st, n Plato , Longhaye, and
Irving Babbitt, hale been ohosen.
oan be stated thus:

The preoise point at issue

Is the basio oonoern of humanism, his-

torioally oonsidered, ethioal or li terary?

The reply to this

question is briefly, that to t:re minds of eaoh of these men
oonsidered as humanists, the main issue is ethioal, the literary issue secondary, and in eaoh instanoe the humanist's
ohief literary tenets are strongly influenoed, if not wholly
determined, by his solution of the &hioal issue.
I

Historioally, those who have claimed the title of
ffhumanist lf have almost always been directly interested in the
anoient olassios.

At one time, we are told, a mere knowledge

of the olassio tongues was suffioient to justify the claim.
This interest, however, is a manifestation at best and by no
means either necessary or infallible.

The most ardent Oio-

eronians among the Renaissanoe humanists, not to speak of

3

those scholars who were drawn to the Greek culture, clearly
confirm this.
an end.

The Classics, with them, were an occasion, not

"{hat drew them to a love and study of anoient letters

was the ideal of human life that they glimpsed beyond.

As

Babbi tt says, tlThey actually oaught a glimpse of the fine
proportionateness of the anoients at their best. n2

Those who

became studious of anoient sculpture and painting evidenoe thi
ulterior motive even more olearly.

That is why we must admit

that those who oarried imitation of the ancients into the
conduct of their lives) as well as into the style of their
letters, were aoting consistently.

They were looking for

els of conduct even more than of epistolary eleganoe.

mod~

As we

come closer to our own times this ulterior interest is more
am more apparent.

With Father Longhaye and the School he

•

represents, the olassios are definitely considered a means,
and not an exolusive one, of developing a full and proportionate oulture.

Babbitt states absolutely the independence

of his wh:)le ideal from the olassics, maintaining that it was
achieved. equally well in the Orient. 3 The truth is that in
proportion as men have been conscious of the potencies of
human nature they have been drawn toward an id.eal of its full,
,

proportionate development and have turned with eagerness to
whatever seemed to them to ofter this ideal most completely.
The important thing, in this connection, is the fact that the
need for full, proportionate development is felt, for humanism

4

Such delimination and'dissociation brings out the
main traits of humanism itself.
~ortionate

It desires a full and pro-

development of the individual.

These are its

essential notes, far more basic than the desire of the glorifioation of human nature, which Abb6 Bremond asserts to be
absolutely fundamental.
from the ideal.

Not that this last can be

dissocia~ed

The very desire to realize , culturally, the

fullness of the human stature implies it.

But it does not

imply what the word tfglorification" might seem to oonnote:
the depreciation. of something else, for instance, of the
supernatural.

Proportionateness, rightly understood, should

really exclude any such depreoiation, for a just evaluation of
all things is of the integrity of proportionateness.

The

finished ideal might well be oalled, ethical poise.
The ideal of ethioal poise is an answer to the universal question of the one and many in its most personal
aspect, that of conduot.

It is an attempt to satisfy the

hunger of man's spirit for oneness, completeness, and permanence in a life of experience which is fragmentary, fleeting, and multiple.

.Against the flood of impre ssions borne in

upon the individual and eliciting response from innumerable
quarters, the soul sets its consoiousness of a singleness of
purpose: happiness through the complete and lasting satisfaction of the needs of human nature adequately realized and
fulfilled.

No one experience off$rs this satisfaction,

5

though eaeh offerS some little part of it.

Experienoe brings

fragmentary reports of reality beyond; man desires exhaustive
knowledge.

Experienee puts man into oontaet with isolated

realities; he desires permanent possession of the whole.
Experience brings partial and transient satisfaetion of individual powers; man desires complete and permanent satisfaction of his whole being, of the individual powers as constituents of the vmole.

The task before the individual is to

lay hold on the prineiples of permanence and universality
underlying experienoe.
Among his powers mn must reeognize the sovereign.ty
of those which ean most eompletely and universally bring him
into contaot with reality under its most permanent aspects.
The lesser and auxiliary powers must align themseives in due
subordination according as they contribute toward the attainment of this same end.

When this order shall have been es-

tablished, the relation of man to eXpirience \"1111 be one of
oontrol rather than of mere passivity; of selection and direction rather than of indisoriminate reeeptivity and response.
There are those who maintain that it is not a goal
beyond, but experience itself, whieh is the true end.

To

gain fullness in life, it is contended, is to increase and
intenSify experience, to cram every moment to the brim.

Not

subordination, but balanoe among the powers is to be sought,
with a view to giving eaoh the tallest range of experienoe

6

possible.

Permanence?

They dfspa1r of it.

We die.

Ifl~ot the fruit ot experience, but experienoe, itself is the end. A oounted
number of pulses only is gilen you of a
variega~ed, dramatio life."

Against them stand facts of experience, which most of us
learn all too early in life: the easy satiety of every

indivi~

ual power, even ot its keenest pleasure, and the consequent
revulsion from the very object ot satisfaction, and the inability of an indefinite number of distinct actsJwhioh bring
each its partial pleasure) to produce, in sum, happiness.

As

a matter of fact, such a series, were it possible, would lead
to the same revolting satiety.
pleasure; it

~anscends

Happiness is not the sum of

pleasure.

It must consist in the

single act of permanent possession of the one objeot whioh
can satisfy the whole man.

Our only chanoe for happiness is

to bend all aotivity, qualitatively and quantitatively, toward
the possession ot this object.

Ordered power, as opposed to

indisoriminate intenSity, in aotion, with all that "order"
implies ot direction, selection and purpose, is the key-note
of humanistiC poise.
With thiS, I believe, we have reached true oottom.
It adequately oovers the striking similarities in all presentations of humanism; it alone makes adequate provision for
the even more. arresting di versi ty~

It can readily be seen

how doctrines, which agree on this point, may differ "toto
caelo."'

The details of the ideal will depend upon the view
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taken of human p.ature itself and of man'$ place in the world.
The positivist will elaborate this ideal in a way which the
realist mustl in part) re ject.
and

the Chri stian he,re

The pagan, born or self-made,

will meet and part company and yet,

within the terms we have laid down, the name "humanist" can
ue denied to none.
The humLmists whom we shall study in the following
chapters were chosen with this in mind.
are

a')

Their divergences

:par en t to the mos t superfioial reader; their similari ty

is even more apparent to one who studies them critically; and
both

si~ilarity

and divergence centers on the point mentioned.

II
Although the ethical issue is uppermost in the mind
of each of these humanists, they are all)nevertheless,deeply
concerned with the problems of literary criticism.

In

Babbitt's ease the literary interest seems to have been the
starting point of his speculation on the question which came
eventually to supersede it in his mind.

He eame to give his

chief attention to the ethioal question because he saw that
the true solution of many basie literary questions, in fact
of the whole cultural issue/lay here.

Plato, himself a poet

and th e prince of stylists I had ever tre cause of literature
at heart, and though he passes severe judgement on it at times
this is only because, while recognizing the superior claims

8

of ethics, he could not see his way clearly to the settlement of some delicate points of adjustment between literature
and morals.

Father Longhaye brought to his speculation on

literature a mind already formed along sound philosophioal
lines and for him the ethioal issue was settled.
in no 'Clay imped.ed his literary Judgment.

But this

On the contrary,it

gives him a distinct advantage beoause it enables him to
disentangle and elucidate issues which to the mere li1t~rat~r
are hopelessly muddled, and, to the thinker who is trying to
reach a solution of the ethioal issue from a baSis in literature, present proolems almost equally hopele ss of solution.
As a oonsequence, his c onclusions J though sometime s rigid) are
always lucid and for the most part irrefragable.

Although

our chief conoern here must be an examination of the ethioal
doctr ines of these humB.llll.i sts we shall) neverthele ss) be -oetter
equipped oy this very examination to understand more oompletely their ari ti oal opinions,.

VIe shall} therefore} ven ture to

point out the associations between their oritical and ethioal
Views, and. to trace/in the ethioal, the roots of the literary.
To examine the worth of the oritioal tenets themselves is
obviously a f'urtl;er task beyond our present scope; some adumbration of where the preferenoe would lie, however, even in
the literary issue, cannot fail to appear in the examination
of' the ethical doctrines. A word concerning the seleotion of the works examined
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will not be out of place.

!he Republic, as the oentral and

most dogmatic statement of Plato's thought upon many subjects,
is an obvious choice.

The Belles - Lettres of Longhaye re-

commends itself as obviously a more
either the History or

~

~itable

Predication.

treatise than

In the case of Babbitt

it has been no easy matter to concentrate upon a mngle work.
Since his writings are mostly critical, the positive aspect
of his doctrine must be gathered piece-meal from them all.
Rousseau

~

Romanticism has, however, given yeoman service as

a good summary of the substance of his teaching on this pOint.
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CHAPTER

I

1 Henri Br$mond: A Literarr History o~ Religious
Thought In Franoe ,(Naw York, .tiomll an, 1928), p. 6.

-

2
Rinehart,

Humanism And Ameri.oa, (New York, Farrar and
1930). p. 26.

3 Rousseau And Romantioism, (New York, Houghton
Mifflin Co., 1§1§), p. XiX.
4

Walter Pater: Renaissanoe, (New York, Maomillan,

1908), p. 249.
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CHAPTER II

IRVIliG BABBITT'S
IDEAL OF ETHICAL DECORilld
The late Abbl Br~mond wrote, with referenoe to the
humanists of the Renaissanoe:
nThe day is not far distant when a new
humanism, less exuberant, out also oelieving, less tradioniste, than the earli~r,
will oause more serious disquietude. uL
From all indications, his prediotion has been fulfilled in
the dootrine of Irving Babbitt and his followers.

That this

new humanism is lass believing, less tradioniste, than the
earlier is apparent at a glance.

Tba t some disquietude has

ac oompanied its rise is al so true, and the judgme nt of Professor Meroier that it is a doctrine we may disapprove, out
dare not overlook, finds a wide eoho. 2 But, one may ask, to
whom has it br;)ught disquietude?

On this point the propheoy

of Abbe Br~mond does not find so accurate a fulfillment.

He

thought tha t the ohampions of the traditional faith and of
the elder learning WDuld have most to fear, while, in faot,
they alone oan look with equanimity, even with some approval,
on the infant philosophy.

While the humanism of the Renais-

sanoe was the initial step on the road whioh ultimately led
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to naturalism, the humanism whioh the

Harvar~

professor advo-

cates, with all the ardor of a oonseerated apostle, is at its
very eore a protest against naturalism.

The noonservative lf

and fftradi ti onal, If no t to say reaotionary, soho ols have nothing to fear from suoh a oreed beoause they have long sinoe
learned that between naturalism and supernaturalism there is
no compromise.

Unless the new movement oeats a retreat to

the naturalistio plane upon realizing this, we may hopefully
expect the-trirunph of the full truth in the minds of those of
its proponents who sinoerely seek the truth.
I have spoken of Babbitt's humanism as a dootrine.
It is just that, and has in this faot its essential marks of
differentiation.
of soul.

Humanism in Plato was an immanent quality

The humanism of the Renaissanoe,

asm, an overflow of animal spiri ts.

was an enthusi-

Of Christian Humanism,

~
AbbeI' Bremond
says: "It is essentiaUyatemper of mind. n3

hlli~anism

The

of Irving Babbitt is a "gospel",professing to offer

a oomplete philosophy of life and salvation to our age.
course, it VJas not always so.

Of

The first volume he published

was a oolleotion of essays in defense of the hwnanities.
Al though tte se oontain in embryonio form, as Meroier p-)ints
out, the whole of his dootrine, Babbitt does not appear to
have realized at the time the ramifications whioh would beoome neoessary.

His own development seems to be an instanoe

in proof of his oDservation that the "eoonomio problem would
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be seen to run into the philosophic, etc. n4

The defense of

the humanities, he oame to see, is but one small portion of
the fight which must be waged against the solvent and liquefying foroes of na. turalism.

He felt' tm t he had c orne upon

the oasic fallacy of naturalism which vitiates its every conclusion.

He struck, as he thought, at the root of the evil.

But he did not strike merely to destroy.

He had something

to offer in place of what he had torn down.

In each succeed-

ing volume, as he worked out his theory into various fields,
literary criticism, economicS, morality, he came closer and
closer to his final stand:
istic principle.

a philosophy of life upon a human-

Upon this he seems to have rested, though it

is said he had embraced a superna tural belief oefore his
death.

His writings do not reveal this ultimate development.

As they stand they my, for our purpose, oe considered as the
final expression of his matured thought.

I

On one sLde Babbitt's position is a protest against
the attempt to build a whole philosophJ of life on a naturalT

istiC foundation. 5

The effect of naturalism in both its

forms, he maintains, scientific and sentimental, is to level
things off to a common basis.
One and the :Hany."

This is its answer to "the

Scientific naturalism does away with the
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distinction oetween man, as man,

~d

nature, maintaining that

marl is but a part of na. ture and nothing more.

Sentimental·

naturalism does away with the distinction between the higher
~~d

the lower self.

With the help of its scientific counter-

part, it answers the question of the nOne and the M:any"

by

lifting the many to a false unity in instinct and emancipating the expansive desires from an "anachronistic" power of
control. 6 Both these seem to Babbitt to ·be but sorry judgmentsjoased on superficial observation and hasty reasoning.
While it is true, in a sense, tha.t man is a part of na. ture,
it is just as true that his part in it is that of king.

It

is neitl::er possible nor desirable, he admits, to deny altogether the olaims of the natural man.

.But eXgerience teache s

that, unless subjected to some can.trol, the natural desires
bring havoc into the life of man.
The basic problem for one who would oppose naturalism,
says babbitt, is to find the best means of re-asserting the
human law/as opposed to the law for things, that is,the law
which must govern the life and conduct of man, if he is to
achieve th e end of his existenoe t as opp.)sed to that governance in the physioal world which suffices to bring unintelligent things to the fnlfillment of thei~ destined tunotion. 7
Naturalism has confused these laws even to the denial of the
human law in favor of the law for things. 8 It seeks to bring
everyt::ling under the law for things.

Only a vigorous re-

-
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assertion of the faot that there is a distinct law for man can
confute naturalism.

But it is futile, Babbitt thinks, to

turn to authority or tradition for suoh a re-assertion.
haS

Han

travelled too far along the experiential road for that.

The whole naturalistic position is built on just this experiential ground, and much in it is true, though needing reinterpretation and completion. 9

Naturalism claims to be posi-

tivistic and critioal; it can be refuted and confounded only
by a still more severe and positivistic criticism.

Naturalism

been posi ti vistic and cri tical, but only on the side of
-has
the natural as opposed to the human law. It has been preoccupied with establishing, on critical and positivistic
ground~man1s

kinship to the brute.

The new positivist must

be critical on both sides; he must push on to the establishment of the human" as well as of the natural, law on a positi vis tic basis.

Thus only will modernity triumph over pseudo-

modernity and critiCism confute sophistr7.
The critical positivist, as Babbitt depicts him, is
necessarily an individualist. 10

This does not mean that the

critical positivist will reject every exterior standard to
make himself the measure of all things.

It means that he

assents to human standards on personally positivistic grounds,
for human standards are nothing more than the embodiment o'f
that element o'f oneness in life which is a matter of experience.

It is the individualism of immediate, in the sense of

-
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'ersonal, perception of the normal a.nd representative in
A(; :

_ hUJIlan exp er ienoe •
But what is the problem with whioh this individual, who
would live by human standards, is faced?

Ultima tely, and in the

widest sense, that of happiness; more proximately;the ethioal
solution of the pro olem of the nOne and the Many. nl1
last is a universal problem.

It manifests itself, writes

.Babbitt, in every phase of life and nature.
l~as

This

~ow,

ontological-

the distinction between the elements of change and per-

manence; again, for the intellect, as illusion and

realit~

whioh oorrespond to change and permanenoe respeotively; and,
nearer at home, in man himself, ethically as the dualism of
his nature:

the multiplioity of his deSires, and the unity

of his power to say "no." ];iust the problem be attaol{ed in all
its aspeots? No, acoording to Mr. Babbitt, for this would be
futile. 12 Because the element of ohange enters into man's
very nature, he cannot solve the problem metaphysically at
all.

What reall ty he rray know is a.lways inextricably bound
up with illusion. 13 Illusion, ohange, enters into the very
notion of personality itself, existentia propria.

The only

sane way out is to narl' O\V the pro blem down to a que stion of
the praotioal oonduot of life.

This means that we must

decide whether multiplioity and unrestraint or unity and control will rule our lives.

On whiohever side the ohoice falls,

the deoision must be measured in human happiness, the ultimate

jlter10n 01'

~11~14 Natura11.a

haa' ta,ea the same ,roble. and

;~f~01ded 1n favor 01' mult1p1101t,- an4 UJU'estra1nt.
,

Natun.l1sa

"

, i'!oons1ders man merely a.s a part otnature and sinoe nature 1s
,'al_'s ohang1ng and evolv1ng, so too 1s man.

The t1n t, to....rd

, _hio h huJDB.n standar48 asp1re 18 11100l'llpat1ble w1 th thla vlew
tt man.

Naturallsm conslders man 11ttle. 11' anyth1ng, mol"

tban a. brute. and the only un! ty known to the llfe 0'1 the

'1"I1te 1s the 1nd1sor1minate response to 1nstinot.

So 1n 1ts

.on08,t10n of 11te natura11sm holds up the unrestra1ned sur'render to ail ele.ental mOTements as an 14eal.

!he tru1t ot

IlAturallsm. whep. we1ghed 1n the 80ales of h,.an happ1nes8, 1s
tound wantlng .15

It 1s t1me to assert un1 t,. the human law,

wh10h tells ue that man 1s more than a part 0'1 uature and
aore than the sum of hls des1re ••
In tak1ng u, thls poslt10n. Babbltt goes 011, one ls
Done the less p081tlvlstl0 and or1tlo&l. for the human law 1s
matter of experlenoe, wa taot 01' immediate peroeptlon, the
presenoe 01' & power of oontrol ln the In'1Tld~1.w16

!h1s

taot, ooupled wlth another taot ot exper1enoe. man's 1nnate
moral 1ndo1enoe, 1s at the basls ot humanlstl0 eth10s.

A man'

splrltual vlgor ls .ea&Ured by hlsexaroise 01' the one anA the
ftnqulsh1ng of the other.

By the keenness 01' a man's perl.p-

t10n at th1s dual taot 1s to be .easure' his 1ns1ght lnto the
human law.

And the aooeptanoe 01' th1s T1ew binds hlm to the

greateet possible etfort.

Jf he

CaQ

40 eo for h1s own happine •• ' sake. 1f

exero1se control. he must

18

But at this point theposi tivistio individualist finds
himself oonfronted with the question of standards.

It is one

thing to be oonsoious of a power of control, another to formula te standards for it s guidanoe.
oriterion of happiness.

In general) there is the

The hu.l1lanist will consent to no

ourtaillJent of his desires which does not make for happiness~8
But something more speoifio is neoessary.

Consistenoy bids

him turn to exper ience in this pass also.

To his own ex-

perience alone?

No, for that would preoipitate him into the

amorphous individualism of th9 naturalist.

Furthermore, the

consciousness of his own moral indolenoe ought to lead him to
look with respeot to those who, in the past, have in some
degree reached the spiritual vigor towards whioh he strives.
He will turn, then, to the experienoe of mankind to seek a
model for imitation.

In dOing so he will not relinquish his

ori tioal and posi ti vistio posi tion, for he will aooept it only
as experienoejand not as authority1and will subJeot it to the
keenest analysis of whioh he is oapable. 19

Neither will he

restriot the experience upon whioh he wi 11 draw, out inoludes
in a generous gesture both East and West.

Experienoe of life

oan be of three kinds, naturalistio, humanistic, an:t religious. 20 Will he restrict his choice here? Yes, and that on
the criterion of the fruits of each in the past.

We have

seen what naturalism does in the Romantic excesses. 2l

To

pass too abruptly fram the naturalistio to the religious level

19

bELs led men to much self-deception in the past. 22

Hwnan,

secular experienee seEmS to be the only solution/to Babbitt's
mind. 23
The rejection of experienoe merely on the naturalistic
level in the formation of standards seEmS amply justified by
the evidenae lIr. Babbitt has oollected
Romantio naturalism.

0

f the bitter fruit ot"

But what is the reason for his distinc-

tion between the human and the religious (supernatu..ral)?
Babbitt's preferenoe for the human is tentative. 24

Humanism

needs religionjout not vice-versa, he says, beoause the ethical life is based on humility.

They must be looked upon as

different stages in the seme path.

One must be eased) as it

were, fran the trough of naturalism to the religious height
on the gentle inoline of humanism.

Consequently, humanisn
must possess some religious insight. 25 It is possiole for a
humanist to be at once mediati veand humble.

Mr. Babbitt

suggests a foundation for this humility in the dootrine, or
rather fact, of moral indolence which, he says, in some way
would resemble the Christian doctrine of original sin, with
the added advantage, however, tha t i t would not jar the
sensitive ear of the man not yet wholly free from naturalistiC preJudioes. 26 ThiS, in addition to a respeottnl attitude toward the experienoe of the past, will furnish the
religious inSight needed.
The critical positivist has yet the task of drawing

(

.: ......

.

\'frODl the exper1ence
,"e

he

has oho.en a worltablJt' m04el tor 1m1 t&-

tl0n • H1s att1 tucle, we have ...n, wUl have th1s m:a.oh ot
hUDll11ty, that he 1s wil11ng to l ...n, and oonscious of h1s own
shortoomings;

he

1s seek1ng staD4aHs aCGord1ng to wh10h he

will exeroise the sp1r1 tual t1re of his 1nns. te pow.r of oontrol.

By what means 1s he to ereot these standards trom the

lead mater1al of the past and rev1vify 1t to the present?
leason, 1mag1nation, and the or1ter1on of representat1veness
01'

norma11ty, by which last ean only be meant Widespreat

reourrenoe and produot1on of the greatest hu.man happ1ness. 2?
When the or1tioal human1st shall have formed these standards
and have d1so1plined

1~ulse

to the1r measure he shall have

reaohed his goal, deoorum, whioh Babb1tt def1ne. as "the pull1ng baok of 1mpulse to the proport10nateness wh10h has been
peroe1ved. aB8 It seea. neoessary to examine at this po1nt
the part to be played by eaoh of these f'aoul tie. s 1n the work
of the erection of standards.

!h1s is by no means the sim-

plest task 1n the grasp1ng of Mr. Babb1tt's pos1tion.

ne is

-

oareful to prepare us somewhat. 1n the prefaoe to Rousseau and
!omantio1sm. for the role he intends to g1ve to the 1magination. 29 Ult1mately, all seems to go baok to his att1tude to-

ward the ep1stemological problem. For him,the prob1am is
inoapable of metaphysioal solut1on.

All the reality man oan

grasp 1s known through a veil of 1l1usion.

!h ere fore , the

soundness of the only solut1on posa1ble for him, the ethi.al

-
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solution, rests on the: right use of illusion, rests on the
pro yer use of the right kind of imagim. ti on. 30
There is imagination and imagina tion.l says Mr. Babbitt t
but every kind is not effioient for our end.

It was by a

sheer mistaking of this much known, but little understood,
faculty that Romanticism was led into some of its most egregious errors.

Hr. Babbitt. distinguishes broadly two kinds of

imagination: the classic and the romantic) and these are at
poles on e.very major point. 3l

The Romantio has at its core

the strainin.g away from the actual; the classic finds in the
actual its oenter an d point of departure, in a sense, its
norm; the romantic revels in the unique, the eccentrio, the
erratic, the purely personal; the cassic seeks to disengage
from the welter of the aotual what is representative and
nonnaJ.. 32

The imagination which the cri tioa.l humanist will

press into his service) in erecting from the experienoe of the
past a model fo r his own conduct, is the ethical imagination,
which is best defined as the olassic imagination ooncentrated
on the human law. 33

The humanist will seek to disengage the

normal an.d representative from the experience of the past

to be held up as a model for the exercise of the power of
control.
This is not. a mirage, Babbitt goes on, for despite
the. vast difference which may exist between convelltion and
conven tion as removed by time

t

eto. t the re a.re perceivable
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in the flux a constant element, oertain "unwritten laws of
he a ven •

1134

This is a fact of experience, for we find in

1'11'1 ters of ancient times J and of OQnven tions far removed from
our own) truths of human experience which are valid today,
maxims of conduct which are still vital. 35
where the critioal power must enter here.

It is easy to see
It will De the

office of reason to keep the critical positivist,who is thus
exercising the imagination.lin touch with reality, first of all
wi th the reality of the facts of past experience on which he
is drawing, and secondlYlwith the reality of his needs in
making the necessary ad jus tmen ts to the pre sent.

For this

work not every exercise of the reason will do.

Here I!r.
Babbitt distinguishes the meanings of "reason. R36 He enumer-

ates first/the mathematical reason, secondlY,the reason of
oorm:l.on sense, and la stly, imagina ti ve reason.
ician 1 s reason can help not at all.

The ma thema t-

Good sense, which "may

exist in many grades ranging from an intuitive mastery of
some field to that of the ethos of a whole age," comes much
nearer the need.

riut in the past this good sense has come to

be conceived of as opposed to imagination. 37

This error must

be rectified oefore one has the kind of reason needed: the
reason of good sense sublimated by union with that power
whereoy it is "enabled to go beyond the conventions of a particular tinle and country and lay hold...
laws of heaven. n38

on the unwritten

It is the work of this reason, having
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I$l'pasped the oentral facts of pa.t experienoe, to relate thea

: to reality in the past) to prevent groundless idealizing) and
. to fit the se faots into the pr••ent.
~ination

!J!he work of the ethio&l

is to mold these faots)on which the imaginative

reason has laid hold,into a permanent rounded model for imitation.

The imagination gives unity, the reason reality.

what is unity without reality?

For

!he Romanticists found it and

ended in being completely submerged in its falseness. What
1s reality without unity? Nightmare. 39 But we must not .
forget, while thus analyzing his pOSition, that the oritioal
positivist ultimately takes his stand on inSight, which

~.

Babbitt defines as "the immediate perception of something
,anterior to thought and feeling, known practically as a power
of oontrol. ,.40 !J!his insight and the exercise of this power
of control is the measure of' man's spiritual vigor.

!J!o give

permanence to the action of this power he must cultivate
habits in the line of control. 4l A man who Shall fulfill
these things shall be on' the high roa4 to the land of Heart's
])tsira for the humanist: decorum, which is defined as "onl,.
the pulling baok

~f

impulse to the proportionateness whieh

has been percei.,.ed with the aid of wha.t one may term. the
ethioal or generalizing imagination. w4a

II
Bab~ltt1s

basic fallaoy lie. in his attitude toward

ftha t aspeot o:f the question or: the One andr.iany whioh
salls the epistemologioal problem.
of the flux.
ing.

~he
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he

He aooepts the oontinuity

Life presents a oneness whioh is always ohang-

element of oneness is always assooiated with re-

ality, the element of
with illusion.

cl~g~"as

every psychologist knows,"

This ceaseless change is not a thing apart

from Iran which, swirling about him, yet leaves 11in unmoved.
He is himself a part ot the flux, a oneness which is always
ohanging.

Oneness and change, reality and illusion are in-

extricaoly intermingled within man himself as well as outside
him, so that "whatever

~eality

mixed up With illusion. n43

man

ca~

know is inextrioably

Illusion is an integral part ot

his intelleotua 1 life.
The first slip seEmS patent.

Ba-bbitt opposes the

oonst~:~n

t e lemen t to the elemen t o:f ohange as reality to illu-

sion.

Yet on what defensiDl e grounds?

What is there to

compel us to oonclude that what remains is real, while that
whioh passes is only a fiotion of the mind?

Let us take an

example, prosaio enough in itself, but to the point; sinoe it
strike~

not only at this error, but at the one whioh follows

immediately.

In a growing ohild we see the one

person~lity

rapidly passing through stages of' phYsioa.l and. mental development, from the night of

in~rtioulate~ess

and helplessness,

through the beautiful dawn of consoiousness into the noon of
intelligent speeoh, purpose:ful aotivity and the vigor o:f
~•.., ' - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -_ _ _ _.......J
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young manhood. or womanhooci.
questioned.

'l!h$ oneness here cannot be

We recognize tha.t it i$ the same person who

displays the various traits discovered day by day, as the
personality unfolds itself.

Nor wOQld anyone hesitate to

associate this oneness with reality.

But were these changes

illusions or fiotions, because they passed, shaken from the
shoulders of the youth like outworn garments?

Obviously not.

Babbitt has failed to distinguish properly between substanoe
and acoident.

An acaident, whioh inheres in a subJect for a

time and then passes away, is· not unreal beoause it is unlasting.

A amall boy's littleness is not a fiction of the mind

because the boy will soon grow into a man and his smallness
change

to fUllness of stature.
Consider the growing child in another

light~

He is

not u...'1.ique, but on.e of a large group t the mambers of whioh
have a perfeot resemblance to one another in some common
note, here, the note of growing childhood.

Considered so, he

presents another aspe ct of the 04e and the Many which troubles.
Babbitt greatly •. As an individual in a olass he is but· one
example of something general and oommon to all the individuals
of that olass.

But in reality, in things as they are, only

the individual s exis t; as Ba hb:i tt would say t only th e many.

Babbitt's diffioulty in either case lies in determining just what we can know.

Led on by his predeterminati. ons

he falls into theposi ti vistio trap and ooncludes, "only that
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::;ts real whi ch is imma dis. tely percei ved. ,,44 A.ll else is illu,ion.

Obviously we cannot know illusions.

In the first case

we parcei ve, not the perSisting) nor the changing element but
• persistent eleman t which ahanges.

The change i s associated

wi th i.Llusion and aannot be the ob je at of knowledge.

The

"

~, proper object of knowledge here iSI consequentlYj the persistent

'element grasped through the I'veil of illusion. "45

In the

second case we percei va imrnediately only the individual.
!herefore, weaus t deny reality to the common note.
can know is
r ,.

All we

tte individual persistent element and that only

as modified by illusion.

No

a~ute

universals; not even an

,absolute individual.
Some alleviation of this distress may come, of a
sketchy statement of the view of philosophy onthesa points.
It is true that in things as they are the elements of change
and perman.enoe are inextrioably intermingled, that the universal has but potential being in individuals.

But one

must, despite the psychology Babbitt invokes, deny that the
changing element is to be aSSOCiated with illusion and repudiate the

gr~dlessassumption

that reality can be pre-

dicted only of objects of immediate perception.

While in the

ontological order these eleman ts are indi ssolubly united, in
the logical. order they oe.n 't)e separated.
entangle and alassify.

The mind oan dis-

The legitimate products of induotion,

general conoepts, are valid and have reality. though they
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";Jti st in tre logioal order only. a.s universals.
iis founded in that perfeot

simili~de

Their reality

existing in the ontolog-

iaal ord.er between the individuals of any olass.

.

:,:an's know-

ledge is not limited to individuals, since the universal,
verified in indiViduals, is real

anQ

the valid objeot of oog-

nitio n ; neither is all known reality bound up with illUSion,
nor even wi th ohange, for man knows essenoes, the essenoes
even of the changing elements, and these essenoes are real,
'; eternal in possibility, immutable in aotion, neoessary in
consti tution. 46
To dwell at suoh length on the epistemologioal diffioulties involved in Babbitt's position would be inexousable
were it not that momentous issues affecting the soundness of
his entire struoture depend from them.

His attitude here"it

seems, gives immed.iate rise to the three most distinotive
characteristios of his system: the unique (and exaggerated)
t,\

view of the imagination, the insistenee on a power of oontrol

: 'as

the basis of spiri tual effort, an insistenoe whioh has

led some to class him outright as a voluntarist, ani the
ultimate inadequaoy of his finished ideal of humanistio de~i

corum.
Taking his stand on th e positivistic' maxim, (quite

t undemonstra blEt,
,w

by th e way, am. tha.t not because it is self-

(eVident), that "only that whioh.is immediately peroeived is
I

r

i

real,n he is naturally led to seek some fact of immediate

28

;.erception upon which to found his re-assertion of the human
: law.

This he thinks to have found in a dualism within the

f<

',' individual, and;more particularly. . in one aspeot of that dualism.

It is a faot of immediate, individual experienoe that

.• hil e each faoul ty is eager for i tsown sa tisfaotion

irre~

spectively of any other, the eye of all seeing, the ear ot, all
hearing, eto., man is oapable 01 oontrolling this innate
essential tendenoy.

He oan restriot the use of one faoulty

to favor the exeroise a:lf another, and can determine aoti vi ty
Doth

~uantatively

'absolute.

and qualitatively.

This power is the one

It is anterior and Sllp.erior to thought and. feeling

and it is immed.iately evident.

It is man's distinotiveohar-

aoteristio)whioh sets him a oreature apart, lifts him above
the flux, gives unity and purpose to his life.

It is but

logical and Just that it should beoome the head of the oorner
in the new ethios.
No fault oan honestly be found with thiS.
• is

pre~ent,

This power

is distinctive, does give unity in a sense.

It

is to oertain nuanoes, oer,tain implications, even accretions,
to which one must)in the name of common sense;take exoeption.
The first springs from the depreoiation of the intelleot and
oonsists in the assertion, some times explici t, sometimes impll

t;·

ed, that the Higher Will is not only prior to intellect in

. dignity but, in some obscure way. prior in faot.

It is the

elUSive, tantalizing aBsumptionof this faot whioh has led
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sorne to pronounce the condemnation of voluntarism upon him.
He appeals to the East 47
to 'vJhat avail?

for a precedent in the matter, but

This is but to involve Eastern thought in his

own condemnation.

Nor need we rrake too much of the matter

siLce he himself admits that the power must be used "intelligently.n48

But it presents a real difficulty, unless we

press this admission, and for clarity it is well to consult
the teachings of philosophy upon the matter. 49
The dispute as to the priority between will and intellect
strikes one as rather futile.

The nexus between them is so

close that one is tempted. to waive the whole matter.

But it

is manifestJupon due reflectionJthat the will is certainly
prior in digni ty/ since with it rests the ul t irna te po sting of
the human act.

The intellect, however, is prior in activity,

since it alone can present the alternatives between which the
will must choose.

We use intellect to mean, of course, the

mind in the exercise of its powers both of analysis and synthesis, and not in the restricted sense in which we shall
find Babbitt using the word.

st. Ignatius Loyola well illus-

trates this necec:sary d.ependence of will upon intellect, at
the same time ascril')ing to the will the liberty which becomes
it and constitutes its dignity, when he urges upon his 1'01lowers)not merely coni'ormi ty of act) but also of intella ct and
Judgment in the exercise mf. obedience, meaning that they
Should strive to grasp the Su)erior's point of view in any
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given order, sinoe "the will oannot for long obey against the
und.erstC:l..nd.ing. "50

By interpreting Babbi tt' s f'intelligentlyff

with generous latitude, we may point out the d.iffioulty without exaggerating it.
A further defeot which cannot be so

l~ppily

d.isposed

of; and whioh has its origin in the failure to appre cia te the
true relation 01' will and. intellect, manifests itself in the
opposition of the power of control to the "ord.inarylT will.
The ;'ord.inary:l will is that native tendency of man, considered. as a composite of faculties and powers, or of the powers
COrlsidered. in themselves, to seek full, unrestricted. satisfaction and. activity.

This tendenoy is the real oause of the

expansiveness of desire of which Babbitt speaks so frequently.
The pre sence of this tendenoy is a faot of immed.iate experi";'
ence.

'.rhe power to c'.:ntro 1 this tendency is al so a fact of

immediate perception.

This power he oalls the "Higher Will"

and. opposes it to the expansive tendency of desire as to a
"Lower 'Hill.1I

Let us grant, for the moment, that a !1Higher

Will!1, just as Babbitt conceives it, does exist; it becomes
immeG.ia tely apparen t tha t such a power cannot be opposed to
the 1ford.inarylT wi 11.

Both the Ifhigher ll and the ord.inary

wills, Babbitt would. admit, tend toward. the perfecting of
man's nature, the 1Tlower" blindly, the flhigher IT intelligently.
The only ground upon whioh the s-upremacy of the lIHigher Will"
could. be asserted is tha t th e perfection of man's nature is
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attained. more fully or

~nore

easily und.er its guid.ance.

thiS case, the relation of the rJlIigher
d.i nary wi 11 should be one

0

r;ill~l

f directi ve co -

toward. the

J )U:;'12. t

In
01'-

ion./ ra ther

tilan of inhibitory opposi tion, since the ord.inary will has tre
Will. tf
saoe end as the "HLo:her
~

Viewed.. in this way, there is

some ground. i'or the comparison which has been drawn between
Babbi ttl s I1Higher Will" and the rational appeti te of the
Aristotelians.

But Babbitt himself did not conceive the

"Hi'her '/[illll as directive so muoh as inhioitory.

There is

no r,")om ill human nature for a purely inhibitory power.
This fai lure to dea 1 adeqw3. tel.y wi th th e rela ti on
between intelleot and. will leads to a further d.evelopment,
one which Professor ::eroier hai ls with an enthusiasm it is
hard. to share. 5l

This is nothing less than a mild ciivinizing

of the power of oontrol.

The argument as Professor :Ieroier

sums it up runs thus: IIIan is consoious of a power
over the expansi ve desire.
thi S re straint.

0

f oontrol

3ut reason alone oannot impose

This wus Pla to T s fallaoy.

lowel' or ord.inary will restriot itself.

I'~ei the:!:'

oan the

Yet, together, these

exhaust the nature of man, "rational animality.!T

So, Babbitt

eonolud.es) (and. !,Ieroie:...' appla\lds), the higher power must be
from without, must be d.ivine. 52

1;11an, as professor Meroier

puts it, is not merely a rational animal, but a rational
animal plus this di vine something.

And. he .triumphantly oon-

elud.es that 1.11'. Babbitt has established, on purely positiv-

,-------------------------------------------.
32
is tic grounds, the existence in man of a 5upernatural sometl1in~ akin to the Christian's graoe o:f Qod. 53

Wi th all respeot to Professor :.Iercier, we must protest
tw.t }le is going too svviftly.

On Mercier's own statement,54

no t to oall on Babbitt himself', the la tter d.o es not d.eolare
ei ther for or against th e e:criste!1oe of God. because a o.eolaration either vrd.Y VJould. be unpositivistic.

To deolare the

pre senoe wi thin man of a divine power, while refusing to commit oneself on the existence of the souroe of such a power,
is somewhat di sconoerting.

The argument agai.:'lst such pro ce-

d.ure is that of Sacra tes against :;:.Iiletus.

rrhe extr'avaganoe

of tllis assumption is manifest in the light philosophy throvJs
on the time relation of will and. intellect,and Babbitt's
arbitrary limitG.tion of the word rrreason ff , of 'whioh we shall
speak, holo.s muoh of the explanation for the whole question.
The diffioulties into which Babbitt is led by reoalling Joubert's assertion that i1lusion is an integral part of
man's life are not ended.

Granting the power of control as

he sees it, let us reoall that he is oareful to oaution its
intelligent use, its use, as beoomes evio.ent, in acooro.ance
with some intelleotual norm.

Suoh a norm, to be effective at

all, must be universal in character.

A measure which is use-

less, save in a particular eBse, is not a norm but an ecaentricity.

Babbitt conoedes this.

But his theory of knowled.ge

precludes our grasping universal essence, the essence of good-
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or righteousness, for example.

It preoludes these uni ve

( sal norms and, unless some' expedient be found, condemns us to

L
,: sterility

in the fruit of the "Higher Will."

Babbitt thinks

, to have found an esoape in the very element of illusion.

"The

solution lies in the right use of illusion. n55
At this point in his exposition he eQuates the term
"illusion" and. "imagination" in a very oonfusing manner. 56
AS a natter of faot, they cannot be equated at all if we aim

;.'

;

at any accuracy.

Illusion d.enotes d.eception of the subject;

~>

"

~':

r

the object is not there; at least, is not there just as he
thinks he peroeives it.

In the aotivi ty of the imagination,

however, one is perfectly certain, under normal cond.i tions,
that all is a mere representation.

Obviously, illusion oannqt

be what Babbitt means, and realizing the implications of the
word he shifts to the word "imagination" as more or less oommonly understood in the actual elaboration of his i&6&.
Since imagination is to do the work usually asoribed
to intelLeot, we may expeot to find. strange powers attributed
to it.

And we do.

The norms for the exercise of the "Higher

Will" must be universal, at least flexible so, that is, they
must fuse into a unity the oommon element in the multiplioity
of experienoe.

Reason, E!B.ys Babbitt, sinoe it can grasp only

the inti vidual, is tied down to the many and must give way to
the imagination in virtue of the unifying power he asoribes
to the latter. 57 He is oareful to distinguish the kind of
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,lJIlagim tion he means: the ethioal imagination, whioh may be

fa.ef'ined briefly as the olassioa.l or seleotive imagination oon~

" centra ted. on th e human law.

It is opposed to the romantio( or

'expansive and sensuous) imagination and is oharaoterized. by a
power to deteot similari ty and d1 versi ty and. to unify or
: synthesize similars, not into an absolute universal, out into
':- a standard, an em 0 odime n t of th e no rmal t in th e sen se
~

representative or loosely generio.

0f

the

Nothing is said of the

'power to determine whether the na ture of the similarity ue
accidental or essential or merely apparent.

Concentrated on

the universal experience of rr:a.nkind., this power will peroeive
, the similar, norrral pre nomena., and ga the ring them int 0 flexible unity, will provide a oonvenien t norm for tle exeroise of
the "Higher Will".

It is the duty of reason, by virtue of

r.~

its analytic pov/er. to determine the immediate applioation of

,

this norm in the present contingenoy.58

,

It would appear that Babbitt, besid.es presenting an

<.

oocasion for a vast amount of misinterpretation, must also
Lebe acoused of degrading the intelleot inexousably.

Uuoh of

the diffi oul ty spring s fro m an unwarranted restri ot ion of the
word "reason. n
!

Certainly, we possess the unifying power of

whioh he speaks, or at least one very like it; and his desoription oorresponds to what is aa.lled, in critioism, the
ftoreative imagination."

'defined.

This, however, must be d.elicately

But to d.eal with trreason" first.

It is a mistaken

opposition he wculd discover between reason and the classioal

f l""gination as analytio

and unifying powers respeotively, for

on what grounds can it be justifie;d?

Certainly not on the

,:

r"

r

ground: of experienoe nor on that ot sound. terminology.

~' Reason, as designating the int elleotu.al elemen t whioh speoi-

,,'

1

fies man, has alve.ys mea.nt)not only tIm analytic powerjwhich
Babbitt would. concede to it,! but also that complementary power
of synthesis which is an essential faotor in intellectual
progress.

,,' synthesis.

Babbitt reoognizes that man has the power of
But he is oonstrained by his own definition to

deny that it is the work of reason.

Forced to look elsewhere t

he is led by the quality of "oreative n imagination whioh
charaoterizes the world's great works of art to seize upon
imaginati on as the faoul ty of synthesis. 59
The phrase "creative imagination")as used in artistio
criticism;needs careful attention.

Do oritics mean by it to

asoribe to the imagination as such, the unifying, purposegiving, directive power implied in the term lIcreative"?
think not.

I

Those of th e Aris"OO telian sohool, from Ari sto tle

to Father L nghaye, oould not do so Without great inconsi~
tency.

The imagination is essentially the power of repre-

senting sensi ble objects independently of their presence.
As such, its unifying power consists in the ability to represent in one image o'ojects wholly distinct.
~. two., three, four,

The numbers, one

(1, 2, 3, 4, ) written Side 'oy side, are
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CertainlY really distinot.

The imagination, nevertheless,

,all represent the image of the number, one thousand two hun-

dred and thirty-four, onoe the integers are peroeived.
>

Fur-

ther, it oan give unity of suggestive sucoession, o'ne image
following upon another acoording to some

connection~whether

in the manner or time or degree of intensity of' other oircumstances of antecedent sense peroeption.

To .unify into a

l,

congruouS, and even a synthetical and

~

seem to be beyond the imagination and to demand a higher

oeautifu~

whole, would

~

1',

directive power.

This higher directive power is none other'

than the intellect in its synthetic oapaoity.

By it we se-

lect, unify, ooordina te and direot the repre senta tions of the
imagination.

By its operation the landsoape artist, from the

panorama of nature, ohooses those partioular details which
" are sui table to the impression he wishes to emphasize and
rejects the less effective, giving unity, purpose and meaning
/ to what else were but detached and irrelevant details.

It

"

enables Homer, from the multifarious

det~ils

of a scene of

departure, to select and unify inCidents, attitudes, moments,
which make the sailing of Ulysses from the land of .A.lkinoos
one of the most touohing love soenes in all literature.

It

is by the intellectual element at work that the imagination
of the great poet, composer or painter is lifted from the
level of mere representation to the exalted. plane of artistio
I'

area tion. 60
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Little would be lost if. while misnaming this power,
; bbi tt would yet by its agency achieve his end.

This is

beoause the ethioal imagination can aohieve no
eniversals based on the essenoes of things.

Even though it

i_ould 80llate the experienoe of the past into a ftstandard lf
rOf ethical oonduct, thi s would be found wanting.

Babbitt

f.

:.sserts that the worth of any standard must be measurable by
,d

:haPpiness,
L

~:lIUst

..
r:lt
p .
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in other words, in terms of the good.

But we

know the good in its essenoe before we oan begin to use

t•

".

as a measure by whioh to evaluate a stand'lrd of life;
.

l~'otherwise we are measuring the unknown -by the undefined.

The

\:.

~
(.

experienoe of the past cannot give us this knowledge; nor

~.'oes

•

he ooncede to the: individual intellect power to gra.sp it •

I~:~

He limits our knowledge to the individual, the immediately
~

;(perceptiDle; to this good thing, to that happy moment.
ness and goodness must foraver elude us.

Happi-

It is this denial

".i whioh vitiates his final ideal, de oorum , or moderation, into

;\'moral opportunism, for he turns from the metaphysioal to the
!

ethioal prOblem, while the latter can only be dealt with in

,. the light of our solution as to the former.
This will oeoome olearer if we examine his use of the
:: word "happiness. n

The ul tina te ori tarion, to whioh tm ethi-

e&l induotionist is to have reoourse in the evaluation of
"experienoe, is the fruit it bas borne, and willoear if properly applied, in happiness. 62

Is it not apparent that upon
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:tbB essential understanding of this word, plaoed in tl:e key

(poSi tion of the stru.otu.re. the soundness of the whole edifioe

,;4epend s.?

;, "an
~.a

Yet Babbitt admits, at least implicitly, that we

never grasp this indispensable faotor.

universal essenoe.

t objeot

For happiness is

It does not mean a happy moment nor an

whioh can give happiness; it is limited neither to the

"

I'

individual nor to the i:nmediately peroeptible.

It designates

I"

t:'

'that very reality whioh is at the heart of every happy moment,
~
~

and of every objeot that aan give happiness and whioh, oon-

.sidered

:;~

in its universality, is applioable to every individual

and yet remains a unity.
norm.

Only thus can it beoome a valid

And. oonsidered thus it oannot be identified with the

individual nor lend itself to immediate peroeption.
last are the very conditions

~bbitt

These

imposes upon oognition

•. and, as a oonsequenoe, he deolares unknowa-ole the very cri te: rion in the light of which we are to pass judgment on the
worth of past experienoe.

The "ethioal imagination" oan offer

but sweeping generalizations as to what, in the past, seems
to have led people to a oondition whioh seems to have oeen
happiness.

~ut

we can never know.

Babbitt speaks frequently of the qualitative differenoe between happ iness and pleasure.

.tlut hi s denial of abso-

lute universals handioaps him herebeoause the 6..istinotion
',SOught must be based on a knowledge of the nature of goodness,
'!the quality oommon to happiness and pleasure.

If the pleasant
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in some sense, goodness, yet in a sense different from
'1;ha t in which it may be predioa ted of happiness, the only
.olution is to push back to the universal id.ea of goodness.
"plAoing its specific note in suitability, we can validly dis'unguish a greater and a lesser, a true and an apparent good,
,'on a basis of the dignity of the faoul ty to which they are
.• suitable.

That whioh beCOl:leS a common end or a total nature

can be said to be a greater good than one that satisfies some
.~

pa.rticular end or some individual faoulty.

Happiness may be

designated as the possession of that good whioh oecomes man's
>

rational nature in its entirety, oonsidered in all its aspects
and

relations; pleasure, as oomplaoenoy in the satisfaotion

of any partioular power.

The universal is the basiS of the
distinction; its denial involves oonfusion. 63
Considered in the light of these remarks, I think, the
ideal of Cheoorum as proposed by Babbitt loses its original
appeal.

Not that it is to be utterly repudiated as worthless.

It is merely insuffioient.

It promises happiness upon modera-

;'

tion without pretending to tell us what hap?iness is, or why
•• mo d.era ti on is' the way to it.

"To be a hu.rnani s t , n he says,

"is to be moderate, sensiule, deoent. ft64
:-. ness?

But is this happi-

To pull back impulse to a vague and tenuous prop or-

tionateness, in the light of an indefinable goal, is oertainly
unsatisfaotory.

The whole ideal laoks oompelling foroe.

This

compelling foroe, whioh should rest upon a grasp of the nature

40

f things, is naturally lacking in a system in which the
:~'poVier

to know nature5is denied us.

In Babbitt's plan, our

,.]t!lowledge is limited to the individual precei ved through a
lyeil of illusion.

As a consequence we are urged to relinquish

i;aspirations toward the universal, the absolute, the meta-

!,,.

-

!: physical,

and to confine our efforts' to practicc:.l Questions

~iof conduct.

nut to solve these, some norm of oneness, of

universality is needed.
!

Since an absolute is denied, we are

offered "standards" which are nothing more than generalizations of instances, making no pretense of plumbing things to
their depths.
These standards are worth just what any hypothesis is
worth until it is seen to be grounded in the nature of things.
They may be convenient, and expedient; they may fit certain
conditions and explain oertain data.

But here they stop •

. Any other hypothesis whioh fulfills the se requirements, even

though it be oontradictory, is quite as valid.
nothing in either of

the~

to compel acoeptanoe.

this, of oourse, and weloomes the fact.

There is
Babbitt sees

This laok of oompell-

ing foroe, he would oounter, insures that flexibility of

standards which is so neoessary for the ori tical modern mind
, and the inviolability of the individual.

As a matter of faot,

the laok of compelling force in moral standards leads to
moral relativism, pragmatism, subjeotivism; anything but reallsm.

It leaves room, not merely for the, play of indi vidua.li ty,

•• for caprioe,
~.e

Little is gatnedb1' the appeal to the ab8o-

of pa8t e%perienoe..

~wn

strauge oOllllusions can thus be

from the past, and, in s:>me R7, twisted into plau8ibil-

1

-.t1es •
To erreot a sound system of ethios we must sound the
.. tu.re of thihga.
~t

Until we oa.n say of any moral standara that

rests upon man's natu.re ad.equate17 oonsidered. that is, in

f,tself and in its relation to God and other oreature., there i.

tao thiDg

to compel the individual to aocept it as a norm for hi.

f..n oonduot.

This 1s not ,to say, of oourse, that the oom-

~"Julsion to be moral oome8 direotly from the valid1 t1' of a norm.

r,,'

~lUch

compulsion is laid upon as creature., conformably to the

t ..oe s si t1'
~of

0f

our na tare. by the Crea t1lr.

heaven are graven in the na1nlre of things, of God, of man

;and of creation. ili
~

The unwr1 tten laws

!he oonstants of experienoe are manife.ta-

t10ns of that nature and oonstant. beoause that nature i. neb.

'1

"as it is.
r.~ogn1ze

To cose to this we must
, un's 1ntelleot upon realit7.
o

the fUll range of

Babbitt's initial error lies

here;'.ing his stand with positivism he falls w1th 1t, and

i<\

:h18 ethioal house of carda oomes tuabling after.

Yet, 1fi thal

J

there is .-o.oll a.eserving ot praise and aooeptance in wha 1; he
....ught.
III

!h1s statement IB\lst appear alaost paradoxioal ooming,
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it does, after what may have appeared to be purely deotive comment.

The only justifioation which oan be offer-

ed is tha t th& oomment offered is based on sound principles,
wb.i ch wake, of course, no olaim to originality.

Soundness of

philosophiC principles is far more desirable than originality.
The oommenda tion now to be bestowed is entirely sinoere and
oan easily be suostantia ted fro m Hr. Babbitt's wri tings.
Let us begin at the beginning and take our stand with
on the faot of experience whioh he deems absolutely
.tu,ndarnental; tha immediate peroeption, in the individual, of
·0

element anterior and superior to thought and feeling,

whioh manifests itself, practioally, as a power of oontrol.
shall presoind, for the moment, from the nature of this
. power) (which we considered a.bove).1 to fix our attention on the
position it holds in Babbitt's scheme of things.

. tJ::e assertion of the pre sence

0

Ultimately,

f the power is a re-&ssertion

of dualism in man, a fumbling re-assertion and, as Dr. Bandas
: )oints out, 66 inadequate, but a re-assertion, nevertheless,
,and. one tha t is made at a cri tioal moment.

i1

high tide of naturalism.

Vie are at the

We have seen its fruits, and since

r'they are evil, we condemn the tree which bore them, to be out
~<4.own

,

and ca.st into the flame.

No more vi tal point at whioh

(to lay the axe could have been ohosen than that at which
t,,.

~:.Babbi tt strikes in the re-assertion of this basic fact.

"

(Jatumlism, he demonstrated, tends to level things off, to
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'degrade man to a mere' part ot nature and.. to dany that war in
i

the oave between expansive desire and direotive oontrol whioh
is the surest mark of his superiority.

The faot of this

oonfliot t whether it be oonoeiTed as the effect of original
sin or merely as innate moral indolenoe t is at the base of
true ethios.

From naturalism's denial of this oonfliot there

have followed principles most corrosive and destructive of all
morality.

Among the more widespread of these principles we

. may name the tenet that man is naturally good, in the sense
tba t when following tm promptings of his nature he will

always and neoessarily do good; that all elemental promptings
are

ne~essarily

good; that life must be unified by a oomplete

i~

'. surrender to instinct.

t to
i

The denial of this confliot gave rise

the myth of pre-conventional s implici ty and spon tanei ty t

at pre-social inoorruption; to the exaltation of pity, and
the exaggeration of the fraternal instinot as oapable ot
oounteracting the urge to

self-ag:,~randizemen t.

This same

. denial lies at the root of all that is objectionable, as
;j being sentimental and false to rea.li ty, in al truism and hu-

manitarianism.

Upon it rests that individualism of

unre~

, atraint and moral indif:ference whioh is sapping tre vigor of
r.l

our generation.

The ory of naturalism is that of Chateau-

sbriand 1 s CllB.otas: ttperisse 1e Dieu qui contrarie la nature,ff
:;1f we but understand God as being any prinoip1e of restrio't10n and control. 67

What could be nobler or worthier ot our
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,eomplete aooeptanoe than the re-a,ssertion of tre, vital faot
-of this oonfliot?

And Babbitt does just that, with a personal

conviotion and a oourageous disregard of parsaaal popularity
, tha.t shed a glow, almost of heroism, about his name.

Pro-

fessor Mercier's tribute finds a wide eoho: nYle my disagree,
but we oannot disregard; and, even in disagreeing, we cannot
, but ad;nire th e courage of his stand. u68

And we may a.dd, its

kt fundamental so lidi ty.
Within this dualism is oontained another of the most
~

praiseworthy and promising pOints of Babbitt's oree4-, the

i

"~'!igher

II

WilI.

Not that his via of this power oan be accepted

.' unconditionally.

I think we made that olear.

.dut the signif-

ioance of the assertion of suoh a power oannot be overestimat-

ed.

As Babbitt oonoeived it, the Higher Will is essentially

free

c~nd

supra me in th e individual.

1>-:oreover, in la'Doring to

- eeta blish its presenoe he has a,l\\liYs argued from experiential
'~,

grounds.

Thus

t

in the Higher Will, he has forged a wea.pon

; with which to attaok the tfunmora,liststf on their own ground.
The~qast

claim to have freed man, on scientific grounds, from

the moral responsioilities attaching to free will.

Babbitt

: olaims to have establisre a., soientifioally , that r!Son is fully
,responsiole fer. his life and. conduot.
The gospel of the essential goodness of man as the
,sentimental naturalist preaches it also aims at the oomplete
liberation from moral responsibility.

But the claims of the

(
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i.cientific apos tles of oehaviorism and mechanism

seem~

even

]J1ore plausible to the oritioo.l, self-as'sured "modern .lind."
!hey have, onoiological grounds, sought to reduoe men to a
';JIlere oomplexity of ohemical and physioal interaotions, ruled
l

:.bY laws over whioh he has no control, indeed, of many of whioh

he is still ignorant, and which work inexorable vengeanoe
--upon tho se who hinder th eir free operation.

Abso lute moral

, 1rresponsibili ty is held out in the name of the se physical
i

and ohemical laws.

In the name of these laws the meohanist

~

ani psyohoanalyst preaoh nemesis upon control in terms of
-repression complexes" and Itinhioi tions."

They claim to pro-

~. pound thi s 1i bera ting do ctrine from the solid platform of

scientific experiment.

To all such the "Higher Will" of Pro-

fessor Babbitt spells oonfusion, for it is based, as well as
the rest of their olaims, not on authority or revelation or
. tradition, but on irrmediate expErience.

They would free man

. from moral resp8nsibility on a positivistio rejeotion of its
(only basis, free will.
r:

In the name of the Higher Will, the

f presenoe of which he labors to establish on a ba.sis of similar
~

'f"

i
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'against degradation to the level of the brute.
:

A noted writer of our day enumerates, among the obar-

r acteristios of our age. irreverence for the past.

This may

I'

"r, be applied with speoial emphasis and. justioe to Amerioa..

Hany

t'1nfluenoes have been at work to form this attitude in us.
, our very na tional birth is a symbol of this spiri t.

We were

\' brought forth in a struggle to shake off a lfforeign Jf domination, and with it went muoh it would have been to our profit
~

to retain.

,~l

Our natural resouroes, which have made us the

'riohest of nations, lave also gone far toward naking us the
'most oontemptuous of the aohievements of other nations, espe:'oially in the past; and the orass materialism of the oivilization we have developed has trained us to look upon suoh finer
;r and nobler achievements of the past as the arts, philosophy,
!

~;and the fruits of culture generally, as incidental interests

~1n

,,'

life wholly suoordina. te to the supreme "business of man.

~;lIhiCh. we were told. oonsisted in industrial enterprise and

;',conomio expansion.

~,'i,

Against thi s orude frontier spiri t Babbitt launohe s a

powerful and pointed attack, plaoing at the base of his
~ .• thioal

struoture reverenoe and respeot for the past.

From

;lts experienoe we are to draw our standards of the normal,
:zoepresenta.tive. and oentral in life.

It is not to form a

~ckground
merely, cast against which the aohievements of
':
age maysta.nd out more boldly, but is to supply the. very
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ding stones of the rrnewft ethios, to furnish the vital
our da.ily lives. the norms by which we measure.
since the experienoe of the past is preserved am enworks of art and philosophy which have oome
to us, it is only oy assiduous study of these precious
itages, ,that we oan draw from tl'em vital influenoe and
ishmen t from our own day.

To turn to the pa.. st for stand-

s means a return to all that is finer and nobler in life,
achievement which transoends materia.l greatness, to works
whioh still live on when onoe belching smokestaoks will
. survive only as blaok and d.esolate monuments of a misguided

.

.oulture.

It means a turning to the inner spirit from the

outer din, to reason from sophistry, to an evaluation of life
acoording to its permanent elements r.ather than by the progress stages

of a ohange-mad age..

There are oome as M.

Maritain, 69 who oannot agree to a parity oetween the heritage
and wisdom of East and West.

Thare is a greater oleavaee

between the East and the West than riabbitt seemed to peroeive,
such objectors would insist.

1~oreovert

tiE special olaims of

Christianity make it impossible for us to turn to any tradition other than that of the West which has recognized these
claims.

We cannot push aside the olaims of Christiani tYj we

must examine them as they are put forward.

For the phil-

osophio thought of the West seems to soar muoh closer to
reality, and Christianity. sinoe its olaims are demonstrated

6.
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CHAPTER

III

PLA.TO AND THE JUSTICE OF THE INNER MAN

The Republio, so patently a work of supreme artistry
and touohing in its vast scheme a world of varied topics,
displays as many facts as a shapely gem, each of which casts
back the light with its own peculiar lustre and attraots with
a beauty proper to itself.

The personality one feels brea th-

ing through every line of delicate poniard-like irony. of
ardent oensure, or of lofty aspiration, is enough to draw one
back to the book again and again.

To the historian, whether

of literature or philosophy the insight it affords into the
ethos of the time, though indireot, is invaluable.

The rhet-

orician and stylist finds, in the rich and varied melody of
its language, in the congwnmate skill of the dialogue, in the
vivid narration, in the delioately. suggestive and oolorful
imagery, and in the subtle argumentation, an inexhaustible
treasure-house of beautiful thought and beautiful speech.
To the student of PlatoniC thought it stands as the sun in

tm constellation of his dialogues, for it is, in the vords
of Paul Shorey,l "a positive, not to say dogmatic, exposition
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Plato's thought."

From this point of view there stand out

from the multitude of questions raised, but not always antwo dominant lines of inquiry, the twofold quest for
in the individual and justice in the state.
Much ink has been spilled since the time of Proclus

in a somewhat futile discussion of the respective importance
.f these themes.

Did Plato mean primarily to elaborate the

1d.al state and only inoidentally the individual just man, or
oonv.rsely, first the individual and then the state, as his
words would seem to indioate?2 Proclus held the latter view,
acoording to professor Shorey,3 while in reoent t~.s so
.minent a soholar as Professor Jowett,' although designating
Plato as above all an ethical psyohologist, devotes his introductory essay to a consideration of the Republic almost
.xolusively from the first point of view.

This seems to be

the more oammon view today5 owing perhaps, as Daniel Sargent
suggests, to our interest aDl faith in sooiology whioh makes
a lodestone of every utopia.

As we might suspect, in snch

a case, the truest view seems to be the one which reoonoiles
rather than opposes the two oontentions.

Indeed, the view

'xpressed by shorey6 and, long before by Zeller, is far more
in keeping with Plato's spirit.

Zeller's wards are:? "For

the Greek, ethios and politics were closely bound up with
each other.

As long as the Polis existed, it was quite im-

POssible to think of the individual as separate from the eom-

54

rnunity.n
The questions were, quite possible, of equal importanoe to Plato's mind, first, beoause

he

was a Greek and,

seoondly, beoause at the time of writing Athens was running
a oourse to whioh he oould not be indifferent, and the Sophists were preaohing an individualism that he oould scaroely
let pass unohallenged.

Is it at all remarkable that in the

Republio, nthe central work of Plato's maturity,n8 these two
questions should oome to the fore, not on an equal plane
merely, but inextrioably intertwined, as, to the Greek mind,
they seemed necessarily to be?

The important thing for this

investigation is that Plato aotually desired to delineate, in
some way, an ideal of development and oonduot for the individual, and this is not diffieult to demonstrate from the text
itself.
It has been remarked above that in Plato humanism is
an inmanent quality; this is so, literally, and the word cannot be truly

pred~ed

of his dootrine until this faot is

reoognized.

Humanism, it has been said, is basioally the

desire to glorify human nature.

This interpretation is not

oonolusive, for the term admits of' several legitimate interpretations.

There are those

who

would glorify human nature,

as Jorgensen says, by making it the aome of all perfeotion.
This is not humanism, but pride; better, pitiful blindness.
There are those who would glorify

h~

nature by yielding
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to what is highest in it the plaoe of pre-eminence and dominion.

Only these really love human nature.

Only these are

exempt from Leon Bloyts scathing denunoiation of that love of
mankind which longs for its damnation and seeks to bring it
about.

Among these humanists Plato must emphatically be num-

berered, in virtue of that native and burning aspiration whioh
breaks through subtilty, irony, and humor to crystallize in
such phrases as nNo man is willingly deceived about that whioh
is the truest and highest in himselt. n9

This is the humanism

of Plato: the highest in man must be made the rock upon which
his happiness is to be built.

I

The theme ot the

Rep~blio

the nature ot human justice.
inquiry.

is an investigation into

But it is by no means a tree

The conviction, (or shall we say intuition?) that

whatever justioe may be it must have its ultimate explanation
in man's nature, and not in anything less fundamental, underlies the whole ot Socrates' disoourse.

Man!! just before he

Even more, the whole ot the first great division
of the dialogue lO is devoted to establish~ this point ot
View, both negatively and positively, and in this light the

-acts

justly.

doctrine set forth becomes

a protest against the superfi-

ciality characteristic of mere traditionalism and half-skeptical pragmatism.
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The negative assertion

o~

Plato's oonviotion takes

the form or a refutation of these two dootrines.
definition

o~

The first

Justioe brought forward rests almost wholly on

tradi tional teaching, and great effeot is gained by putting
it into the mouth

or

the young Polemarchus, who has Just received it verbatim rrom his elder. Justioet l maintains

polemarohus on the authority of the poets and sages of the
pastJmeans giving every man his due, good to a friend and
evil to an enemy.

This is shown to be a weak and an inade-

quate definition because it admits of oontingenoies in which
anything but Justioe would result from its applioation.

To

do evil to an enemy, Soorates argues, would be to injure him
in just that quality whereby he is a man.
effeot of true Justioe.

Suoh oannot be the

The poets could never have meant thi

The seoond objeotionable doctr1ne,l2 for which Plato seleots
a worthy mouthpiece, is dealt with in a similar manner.
Justioe, fulminates Thrasymaohus, is the interest of the
stronger.

How naive, thinks Soorates.

er mistake his own interest?

Cannot even the stro

Where is justioe then?

Thrasy-

maohns is pressed to admit a similarity between justioe and
the praotioal arts. l3 If Justioe i8 similar to a praotical
art, reasons Socrates, like, let us say, the art of medioine,
whioh oonsists in a oertain aptitude and skilfulness in
aohieving an end, must it not like

~ery

other praotical art

serve the subjeot or reoipient of its aotion prinoipally?
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or, does Thrasymachus believe that the primary object of
medicine is the fattening of the doctor's purse?
During this discussion Socrates has oeen gradually
gathering certain positive statements relating to his own
view of justice by admissions gently extorted from his opponents.

Justioe is the distinctively human virtuej14 it is an
immanent quality by which man attains the end of his nature. 15

It dwells always with wisdom and goodness. 16

It is to a

large extent, or perhaps entirely, the determinant of real
haPpiness .17
Finally, in the speeches of Glaucon and Adeimantus,18
the point of inquiry is definitely fixed.

After a thorough

and an eloquent disoussion, the view of those who plaoe
justice in acts and its real worth in something beyond itself
and maintain tha t justice is only the result of a convention
among men, is rejected as inadequate and untrue to fact.
Justice, every reasonable man knows, is desirable for itself
as well as for the peace it brings.

Therefore an adequate

definition must not rest with a description but must plumb
the nature of justioe.

Socrates, in his own mOlok-humble'

fashion, reluotantly consents to undertake the investigation.
No mention of the state has occurred thus far.

It

1s brought in at this junoture as an aid to the investigation
of the nature of ,justi oe •

Since justi oe is a ttri bu ted to

States and individuals alike, suggests Socrates,19 would it
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!lot be advisable to study its nature in the larger unit first)
as being the -same tale writ larger-?
be applied to the individual.

Then the findings oould

No aotual state can serve as an

example, sinoe it is the ideal stat. alone of whioh justioe
oaD be predioated without qualifications.

One must oonsequen

11 be oonstruoted to order, so to say, and Soorates prooeeds
to do so (inoidentally, on a basis of expedienoy and mutual
profit).

The polities about him, nevertheless, furnish many

.

of the details of the ideal state.

This aooount of the origin

of states, oommentators hasten to inform us, is not intended
to be historioal.

There is no need for this oaution.

not so naive as to believe this.

We are

Nor, do we think, was

Plato.
The prinoiple of the division of labor is the root
prinoiple of Soorates' polity.20 This prinoiple rests on the
natural insuffioienoy of any man to provide for all

the needs

of existenoe, strengthened by the faot that one man is more
SUited by nature for a given task than another.

The fruits

of labor, oonsequently, are multiplied ani perfeoted by the
entire devotion of the worker to the task for whioh nature
has best fitted him. So men oame together to form a polity
for mutual profit. 2l The prooess of evolution on this prinoiple is carried by Soorates from the Simple, loose union for
the satisfaotion of the barest needs

ar

life to a oomplex

and olosely knit organization for the attainment of the
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fU,llest possible life.

The finished state, though oomplex in

struoture, is one in purpose.

Its end is the true happiness

of the whole.
st~oturally,

the state is oomposed of three olasses.

The number and oharaoter of these is determined by the needs
of the state on the principle enunciated.

Eaoh olass is

charaoterized by a more or lesa distinotive virtue.

The

lowest am by far the most numerous is that of the artisans
and produoers. 22 Under this head are olassed all gainful
ocoupations, namely the protessions and the trades.

The

second olass, that of the warriors, is oomposed or fighting
men, endowed by nature With courage and physical prowess. 23
Its raison d 1 atre as a political unit is the need of proteoting the produoers, and also to effect desirable expansion
of territory.
ru.lers. 24

The smallest and highest olass is that of the

The rulers, too, are endowed by nature for their
task and holt! power in virtue ot this endowment.

Even more,

the virtue of the whole state derives from them in a definite
manner.

The virtue proper to the rulers is Wisdom in counsel,

consisting above all in a knowledge ot both the greatest good
of the whole and the means of attaining it.

The oourage ot

the warriors depends upon this wisdom of the

~lers

beoause

it is, striotly speaking. the oourage to detend the truths
handed down

by

the rulers as requisites and oonditions for

l----------------~
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the happiness of the whole.

Without this direction the

oourage of the warriors would be but rashness or the ex:a ltation of mere brutish superiority,

No proper virtue is pred-

icated of the class of artisans, but they are conoeded a
share in the temperance whichmmu14 charaoterize all the
olasses in all their aotions.

Thus three of the cardinal

virtues, which are charaoteristio of both state and individual,
are aocounted far.

But what of justioe?

in this fair state?
mutual harmony25

Where does it dwell

Not in any particular class, but in the

among all olasses which is sure to follow

upon each one's tending to its own affairs and in no way
intruding upon those of another.

Let each olass, working

upon its proper level, seek earnestly the virtue and happiness
of the whol., and justice will have here a lasting abode.
Considered from the point of view of the separate olasses,
justice might be called the virtue by whioh eaoh is enabled
to keep its proper plaoe; from the point of view of the body
politic, as a whole, justice might be said to oonsist in the
internal harmony of the socialelements.
The applioation of all this to the individual though
expressed as tentative, is oomplete,and exact. 26 Justice of
j

the individual, too, is found to be an internal harmony or
poise, which come s as the result of proper suOordina tion and
oooperation among the elements of the soul.

Of these Plato

distinguishes three, oorresponding in nature and proper

l-.------------------------------------~
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virtues to the olasses of the sta.te.

The least noble is the

multipliOity of desires we all experienoe, rooted in the natural tendenoy of every power to complete satisfaotion. 27 This
Plato oalls the conoupisoent element, and its only virtue is
the temperanoe to whioh it is disciplined by reason.

spirited element,28

The

fount of so many generous impulses and

that seat of oanrage in man, is far nobler.

But it too derives

its true nobility from the allegianoe it pays to reason.
Reason,29 or intelligenoe, sits godlike in the highest tower
of the soul, ruling all else in virtue of its knowledge of
the good of the whole, and the mea.ns of its attainment.

It is

the sun of individual existence, dispensing, as an effluence
of its veing,light and virtue to all the soul.

When reason,

in virtue of its superior knowledge, rules the activity of
the other elements, duly subordinated, there arises in the
soul true justice, the justice of the inner man,30 of which
that other justice, predioated of the state, is but a shadow.
He in whose soul this sweet concord reigns, is indeed the true
philosopher, "the lover of the vision of truth."
In the ideal of the individual, Plato does not rest
with a general explanation of the knowledge which gives reason
1ts superiority.

T~e

philosopher is distinguished from other

men not only in that he knows more, but beoause his knowledge
is of a higher order and pieroes to greater truth.

The su-

premaoy of reason, in the full sense of the phrase, rests
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upon a grasp of the fundamental prinoiple of existenoe and
experienoe under its most absolute and unified form.

The

philosopher knows the ultimate knowable and he knows it as it

The distinotive quality of the philosopher's knowledge
is universality.31

This does not mean that he knows every-

thing as an aooumulation of faots; it means that he grasps
the unities or essenoes beneath the multiplioity of experienoe
and, ultimately, the real unity, the ultimate essenoe of all
things.

This is the real meaning of the puzzling line Plato

uses to illustrate graphically the grades or qual1 tie's ot
knowledge. 32 It 1s to be observed that 'eaoh step upward, or
to the right, (acoording as the line is represented vertioally
or horizontallY)J1s a step away from the physioal, oonorete
many toward the abstraot, universal one. 33 Eaoh suoceeding
level of knowledge is oonsidered truer as it is more absolute,
universal, and independent of physioal reality as reported by
the senses.

The asoent 1s relentlessly maintained until the

"eye of the soul" is brought to bear fUll upon the ultimate
reali ty , the ideal of go od. 34
The idea of good is the proper objeot of "nous."

In

grasping this, man grasps the key to the universe, for in
1tself it oontains the sum ot· all things.

Its attributes and

funotions exhaust reality, and these Plato draws out in impressive array.
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Primarily, it is the real or ultimate objeot of all
desire.

It is found upon refleotion and analysis, that the

true objeots of desire are not the many whioh present themselves immediately to experienoe, but an absolute perceived,
no matter how dimly, behind them all.

No reasonable man out

will answer, upon being interrogated, that he seeks this or
that objeot beoause it oontains some partiole of, or shares
in, some universal quality.

He seeks this beautiful objeot

beoause it is a tangible aspeot

o~

beauty whioh his soul seeks

as something desirable and snitable to itself.

So it will

be found to be with all other objeots of desire: they are
sought for a universal quality they share.

Even in these

uni versals, the super-universal or transoendent quality of'
desirableness, suitability, is the real objeot of desire.
Goodness, as this desirability is rightly oalled, in its
purity is oonsequently the real objeot of all desire.

people

whose knowledge pieroes no farther than the report of 'sense
ever seek goodness under the manifold aspeot it wears to
sense.

The philosopher, transoending by the aotion of "nous"

the realm of sense-life, seeks goodness in its purity.35
This very trait leads us to see how the seoond funotion of the idea of good can truly be predioated of it.

The

idea of good, says Plato, is the determinant of the usefulness
and value of all other things. 36 Sinoe we seek goodness itself in all, the use and value of all, in regard to the
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attainment of pure goodness, will naturally and normally come
to be determined by the share they have in pure goodness or
by their intrinsiC approximation to it.

Thus the idea of

good is the determining factor of use and value fundamentally.
yet, Plato goes on, how can we tell how olosely any particular
participates in or approximates pure goodness if we have no
idea of what pure goodness might be?

Thus the idea of good

beoomes a determinant in this respeot, formally.

Only the

philosopher knows the idea of good, only the philosophe;
consequentlYj knows the rea.l use and value of life.
It is far more difficult to peroeive wbat was in
Plato's mind when he wrote that the good was author of being
and essenoe 7:"0 E'ivtlJ/ 'l K"'i rn'y oJ(f't~v-, of all things. 37
J

To interpret his brief statement to mean that the goodness
or sui tabili ty of the essenoe of any thing to tha t thing is
the basiS of its reality would be reading too muoh into
words.

~is

This same interpretation might more clearly be stated

thus: unless the essenoe of a thing was suitable to, or good
for that thing, the thing oould never be a reality.

It would,

in other wordS, be a contradiotion of notes, and oonsequently
nothing.

This interpretation sounds dreadfully

li~e

the

schoolman's ooncept of' intrinsio possi bili ty, whioh oonsi sts
formally in a non-repugnanoe of notae oonstitutivae.

Inviting

as this may seem, it is far better to pass it over and oandidly admit that this idea in Plato is obsoUre.

The statement
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stands. however.

The good is the author of being and essenoe.

From this it follows quite easily that the good is
also the author,although indireotly, of intelligibility and
knoWledge.38 A thing is knowable conterminously with its
reality or being, since obviously we cannot know nothing.
~he

soul, moreover, is said to know when it is in conformity

with that whioh is, or as Plato says, ftwhen resting upon that
on which truth and being shine. ft In regard to all else its
oondition is one of unoertainty, for the mind is determined by
reality or being.
From all this it oan readily be seen that the good
is the prinoiple of order in the universe.
that order, but imparts it.

It is not itself

The philosopher who has grasped

the good has obtained what Cardinal Meroier says is the aim
of all philosophy, "a complete grasp of the universe,ft in the
light of a higher reality.

It must not oe supposed that the

good is desirable as the pr1noiple of order.
f~

itself alone.

It 1s des1rable

Be1ng most manifest 1n that order, however,

it follows that the most immediate means ot attain1ng the
good is by a grasp of th1s order, and oonform1ty to 1t.

To

know one's plaoe and keep 1t 1s a oonstant theme in Plato.
But one more aspect needs oonsideration before the
ideal 1s oomplete.

It is the divine element 1n both the 1dea

ot good and the 1ntelleot "nous."

The word "d1vine" as

applied to anything in Plato is a treaoherous term and one
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careful handling lest it confute what it is thought
to sustain.

This is so beoause Plato uses the term so fre-

q,uently, and., frequently, so vaguely.

I

\

As the Abbe Dies said,

.ith pardonable impatience, -Tout est divine chez ce trop
divine Platon." The most orthodox of oommentators 39 seem to
agree that the word is certainly to be predicated both of
reason and

0

f the idea of good.

there is actual textual support.

In the case

0

f the former

-Noue" is that portion of

man's soul which alone is created directly by the Supreme
God himself, and is therefore itself also, divine and immortal. 40 Moreover, the presenoe of this divine element is
the distlnctlve mark of mankind. 4l ~he argument for predicating divinity of the idea of good is not quite so simple.
It is a oonclusion which follows upon various statements and
ciroumstanoes.

~hat

the idea of good is divine seems to

follow upon its similarity to the Creator in the Timaeus. 42
Divinity establishes the link between the books of the Republic as a fulflllmen t of the doctrine of the goodness of" God
-prescribed
in the treatment of the eduoation of the young.
"Now we have already seen that the
preliminary soheme of education was intended
to pave the way for the. later and more advanoed, by inoulcating in a categoriC or
dogmatio form, as it were, the refleotion of
philosophio truths whioh are afterwards to be
apprehended in themselves by ratiooination
and not by faith. It would acoordingly seem
that the Idea of Good, is the philosophio
fulfilment of the dootrine of divine goodness
already imparted at an earlier stage of de-
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velopment. 43
Lastly, there is the ar~unent from book ten (597b),44 and the
divinity asoribed to "nous",45 whioh last, as Adam notes,
makes the separation of

religio~

and philosophy impossible.

It is not diffioult to understand the new oharaoter
given the ideal by this oonsideration.

The divinity of the

faculty of knowledge makes the quest for the truth a religious
aspiration.
session a

The divinity of the idea of good makes its pos-

religiou~as

well as intelleotual,fulfilment, and

validates the fusing of the intelleotual and ascetio or
religious elements in Plato's thought.

Its divinity also

makes the asoent to the realm of being a religious ascent or
conversion.

We oan now grasp more fully the meaning of the

phrase applied to the philosopher, that he is, "the lover of
the vision of truth."

"Lover" designates the religious ele-

ment in the philosophio oharaoter.

The statement that the

divine "nous;' having :for its proper ob,jeot the divine idea of
good, is the distinotive mark of man 46 stamps the ideal as
humanistio in a far higher sense than usually understood
today.

To be a humanist in this sense is to be true to the

very highest in man and to the highest beyond him, God.

II
The laounae within the Platonio system and the failure
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of the system, as a whole, to oope adequately with the faots
of experienoe upon whioh ph1losophy must be based, have been
the subjects at treatment learned and elaborate enough to
conv1ot further disoussions on our part of fut1lity. and even
of impertinenoe.

But even a superf10ial oonsideration of the

1deal of individual perfection whioh we have gleaned from
Plato's writings, may not pass over unnotioed certain points
1n whioh this ideal fails to satisfy all the expeotations we
might justly entertain of an adequate ideal.

We Shall not go

beyond the limits of the ideal itself, and to oonsider its
weak points will but serve to throw into greater relief 1ts
many sound and noble aspects.
~e

most arresting inadequacy in the ideal is the

failure to aooount for free will.

The nexus is drawn im-

mediately between knowledge, (a 'very certain kind of knowledge, to be sure) and justioe, the distinotive human virtue.
Justioe, acoording to Plato, will come to dwell in the soul
when reason, the organ of the highest knowledge, is supreme.
The cave myth illustrates this. 47 !he ascent from the cave
describes figuratively the passage from imperfect to perfect
knowledge.

With the attainment of perfeot knowledge - in(

telleotual peroeption of the good, VOn(T't 5

""

rtJt.i

/1"-'
ala. (;It)
~ Justioe
I

will take up its abode in the soul as a neoessary oonoomitant.
Conversely, we may oonolude that where Justice does not dwell,
ignoranoe holds sway_

Perhaps this direot linking of know-
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ledge and virtue has the advantage of eliminating the knotty
problem of the interrelations of will and intellect.

To

neglect the will, however, is to leave unaecounted for the
most potent force in human nature.

The price of the relief

gained by Plato's theory is too great.
It may seem a St1ffioient explanation to say that
Plato inherited this theory from his master Socrates, and
this is a true explanation to some extent.

Philosophically,

however, it is to be traoed to his conoeption of pure goodness as the object of desire.

The object of deSire, he tells

us, is not any partiaular modified object, but a pure quality
or substanoe. The objeot of' thirst48 is not a 0001 drink,
nor a warm drink, but just drink.

~he

on oircumstanoes extrinsio to thirst.

modifioations depend
The ultimate desidera-

tum of all desire is always pure goodness which is sought
under all oircumstances.
If this is granted him Plato's stand is irrefragable.
It oannot be denied that the will is not free in regard to
pure goodness, (bonum

~

!!!,) in soholastio terminology.

If

pure goodness be the real object of deSire, then the will is
mmply determined.

Only let the intelleot indioate pure good-

ness and the will at once will grasp it.

If man wills aught

else, it may logically be said that he does so
ranoe.
tu.la te.

thro~h

igno-

Exoeption must be taken to Plato's fundamental pos-

,-----------------------------------------------------------------,
'10
It oannot be said without great qualifioation that
the objeot of the will is pure goodness.

Considered in the

abstraot,the human will is determined toward goodness as suoh.
In the
thing.

oonorete~the

objeot of volition is always some good

The aotual exeroise of volitional power is always in

the oonorete.

In the conorete, goodness beoomes various.

An

objeot may be a real or an apparent good; again, it may be a
rational. useful, or a pleasurable good.
has a freedom of ohoioe.

Among these the will

These forms of good are not, of

oourse. mutually exclusive altogetm.r.

With full knowledge,

the will may ohoose the apparent in preferenoe to the true,
J

or a merely pleasurableJin preferenoe to a rational good.
Its ohoioe is always made, of

cours~

sub ratione boni.

We

sometimes speak ot an abstraot quality as the objeot ot
deSire, as when we say that someone always seeks his own
oonvenienoe.

Analysis shows this to mean that he wishes every

Single thing to 'oe to his oonvenience.

In exeroising its

power of ohoioe tb:l w111 is norma.lly under the direotion, not
oompulsion, of the intellect.
the' taot of the will f s freedan.

We mention nothing more than
The influenoe ot oiroumstanoe

and other factors upon the exeroise of freedom, is anothe.r
question.

As a oonsequenoe of freedom of the will virtue

must depend not on a knowledge, but on the deliberate ohoioe
of the highe st a otual go ode 49
Attempts have been made to explain away this diffioul-
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tyof the will In Plato's ideal, by an interpretation of the
nEt tU.re of tlE. knowledge the posse sSion of whioh, Pla to
thought, resulted in virtue.

-Noesis," the knowledge proper

to the philosopher, it has been explained,means a perception
of reality so clear, so penetrating, so illuminating, as to
leave no shadow of doubt in the mind, and consequently, no
hesitation in the will.

It is a faot of human experience,

however, that no mere intelleotual peroeption oan of itself
determine the will.
disappears.
the will.

If this is denied the freedom of the will

No clarity of intelleotual perception oan oompel
It may be probable, at times highly probable that,

granted a pure intention, the man who knows the truth will
ohoose it.

But we ha.ve nothing more than probability, ante-

oedent probability as Cardinal Newman would say.

Returning

to Plato himself, however, it is difficult to see how his
writings give any real support to the interpretation of
"noesis u as a knowledge so olear as to overwhelm the will and
render it incapable of an erroneous ohoice.

The state upon

which justioe will follow, aooording to Plato, is no more than
one of unolouded certitude as to the ultimate reality of
things.

Though Unous" itself is said to be divine, no ex-

ternal suuernatural influence is oonceived to act upon it.
It is the· intellect working on its natural plane.

Conse-

quently we can only say that his theory fails to satisfy
&dequa tely the faots of experience.
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Plato's oonception of pure goodness as the objeot of
desire naturally leads us to consider his attitude toward sen
knowledge.
.noesis~

In his description of the philosopher's knowledge,

the proper ooject ot which is the idea of good, Plato

says that it is a state of pure intelligence entirely free
from the influence of sense. 50 The question pOintedly stated
is: What value does Plato ascribe to sense knowledge?

Does

he conceive of the universal ideas as abstracted from data of
sense or as directly peroeived by the mind and independently
of sense?
In answer to the first question, we must say that
Plato asoribed to the senses their fUll due.

They put us into

contact, he says, with the individual material objeot as it
manifests itself to them, individually and colleotively.5l
No more and no less can be justly ascribed them.
rejeoted
soul.

t~ir

Plato Simply

testimony as insufticient to the needs of the

The real objeot of desire is pure goodness, of which

the senses tell us nothing.

Therefore, the soul oannot oommit

itself to their incom p e tent guidance.
To say that the senses can give us no concept of essenoes is not to say that we can in no way have knowledge ot
universals.
ideas.

Plato reoognizes tha taot that we have universal

But it is a diftioult step trom the individual, mate-

rial report of sense to the universal, spiritual idea.

In

seeking to aocount for the universal, Plato devised a soheme
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in which abstraction, i.e., the disengaging of the universal
essence from the individuals

o~

tion of intellect, has no place.

sense experience by an operaThe intellect, as he con-

ceived it, had immediate perception of the universal.
aocount

~dequately

platonic ontology.

To

for the universal, he devised the whole
The abstraotion of Aristotle and of the

schoolmen solves the problem of universals just as it presented itself to Plato, without falling into his exoesses.
The relevancy of this epistomologioal difficulty to
the integri ty and validi ty of the ideal of perfecti. on is
obvious.

Had Plato not been mistaken in regard to the mind's

power of abstraotion he would have esoaped ma.ny errors whioh
impair the perfection of the ideal.

Goodness as the real

obJeot of desire, the self-existence of universals, the
negleot of free will, etc., would have been avoided.
No little perplexity is oaused the reader by Plato's
disoonoerting use of the word
true of the

applicati~n

~divine.~

This is espeoially

of this word to anous.a

When he

uses the term (or its equivalents), in oonneotion with the
idea

of

Qussion

good, VIe are not surprised.
J

His whole line of dis-

the funotions and attributes asoribed to the idea of

good, its relations to all reality, has been leading toward
suoh a predioation.

When he applies the term to unous,·

however, his basic argument is unoonvinoing.

~ous,"

argues

Plato, is the only portion of tha soul directly oreated by
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the highe st God, and therefore ~ itself immo rtal and di vine~2
The inference d.oe s no t follow.

If it did, we should have to

argue that the human soul, which 1s directly and individually
oreated, (as Christian thought teaches), is divine.
From another angle, however, it is not difficult to
see how Plato came to make this predioation.

The

in

ti~e

which he lived, as we have already remarked, was one of
transition.

Plato oame definitely to rejeot .the old theology.

This does not mean oy any means that he failed to reoognize th
religious element in man.
make this egregious error.

Plato was too great a realist to
As Zeller puts the matter:

"The Platonic ethios, like the SooratiO,
is based absolutely on the autonomy of reason
and is thus far completely independent of
religion, that is, at least of the religion
ourrent at that time:- Yet pratob~ ethics is
'based ona reIigI'Q'Ii7 - his ovm."
Plato reoognized the essential place of religion in man's
nature, and the divini ty of the idea of good and of "nons" is
his provision for this essential need.
to explain the divinity of

Tfnou~"

The theory whioh seeks

and the idea of good as a

ooncession to popular prejudioe in favor of religion show.s how
little its elaborators oaught Plato's spirit.

There is no

diplomaoy in Plato where truth is oonoerned.

The divinity

of the idea of good replaoes the old anthropomorphio gods.
The divinity of "nous" replaoes the old worship of fear and
pro~itiation

with a warship of knowledge and virtue.

must any portion of the soul be itself divine?

But why

The answer

'15

lies in the autonomy Plato ascribes to "nous," the divine
element.

"Nous" by its own power has direot perception of

the divine idea of good.

The element of man's nature thus

able to perceive the divine has about it something of di vini-

ty.

Plato conceived of the relation of "nous" to the idea or

good as the attraction of like to like.

If Professor Adam is

correct in saying that the Timaeus is nothing but an elucidation of the function of effioient cause, asoribed to the
supreme idea in the Republic,54 the partioular oreation of
"noue" by the highest God 55 would follow as the natural explanation of why "nous" alone oan directly

pe~ceive

the good.

The divine origin of "nous" and its power to know the idea
of good thus form oomplementary aspects ot this element ot
the soul.
But the greatest diffioulty raised by the divinity at
"nous, ff as far as the perfeotion of the ethical ideal is
oonoerned, is yet to come.

The divine "nous," says Plato, is

the distinotive mark of man's humanity.56 At first glance
this is simply baffling.

How can a divine element in man's

nature mark him distinotively as human?

The answer seems to

be that Plato appears to have reoognized what may be called
the Sllpernatura.l potency of human nature.
This supernatural potenoy or capaoity oonsists, acoording to soholastic philosophy, in this, that God can
enable human nature to perform supernatural aots without
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~iolating

human nature.

Q.ui te the

00 ntrary ,

human na. ture by

its essenoe lends itself to snoh elevation, whioh becomesJas
a

oonsequeno~

acts. 57

an intensifioation of the distinotive human

Plato, of oourse, did not conoei ve anything as olear

ani definite as this doctrine evolved by the Sohoolman working twelve centuries after the Incarnation and with the negative guidanoe of theology to prevent their falling into many
errors.

Plato does, nevertheless, seem to have hit the es-

sential faot, tmt human nature is oa.pablte in sane way, eitbar
of asoending or being lifted to a greater proximity to the
divine, and of aoting conformably to such elevation or ascent,
not only without violation of its essenoe, but with an aooretion of dignity and power.

He oversteps the mark, however,

when he posits in man's nature some oonstituent that is essentially divine.

This does threaten the humanity.

aggeration is quite understandable, but this truth

The ex-

.!! clear:

Man's very essenoe is sufficient reason for his oapaoity of
being elevated to a supernatural plane of action.
Eaoh of the difficulties we have discussed presents
a distinot obstaole to the aooeptance or Plato's ideal as it
stands.

Colleotively, they are fairly representative of the

errors of Pla tonism.

Nevertheless, they do not dim the splen-

dor of the truths enshrined in the idea.l of the "philosopher. 1f
Balanoed against eaoh other, the truth of the ideal. will be
found far to outweigh the error.

Fairness to Plato requires
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tba tat

least a briet review ot the points ot merit in his

ideal be attempted.

III

The epistemological dittioultybrought out above is
of a deiioate nature.

It concerns what is reoognized as the

most dittioult question in epistemology - that ot universals.
Plato's method ot handling the matter ditters trom the methods

ot all modern schools, exoept soholastioism) in that he does
not tamper with the universal idea.

He never oalled into

question the aptitude ot the mind to know reality as it is.
The universals, to his mind. have objeotive validity, and in
seeking to account tor their presenoe in the mind he holds
intaot the prinoiple of sufficient reason.
essences of things,

w.

We know the

have metaphysical certitude.

one point alone manifests ampl7 his vast

~periority

This
to most

modern thinkers and oontains his message for them.
His stand upon universals is ot vast importanoe to
the ethioal ideal.

As we have seen in the oase of Babbitt,

when the validity of the universal is impugned the only alternative for the ethioal positivist is to attempt a solution
of the problem of oonduot without metaphysios.

The acceptance

of this alternative would destroy ethics as a sCienoe, robbing
its oonolusions of all oompelling foroe and rendering its
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terminology devoid ot meaning.

Plato's ideal ot life is

based on reality as he sees it.

Every aspect of the ideal is

aocounted for by an appeal to the nature ot man, of other
oreatures, ot God.

fhe problem ot oonduot is attaoked in the

light of metaphysics.
The appeal to metaphysics is apparent from the beginning of the inquiry into the nature of justice.

In response

to Glaucon's request that justice be defended on the grounds
of its intrinsic worth, Socrates suggests that the quest for
the nature of justioe be undertaken.

He pursues the quest

first by a psyohologioal study of man in which he seeks the
hidden springs ot human aotivity.

In evolving the theory ot

the tri-elemental soul Plato is preparing a way for a definition of justioe ot which it may be said, "This is true justioe
because man is what he is."

A oonsideration of the nature

of man, however, cannot be carried on without reference to
reality about him.

Consequently. Plato is led to touch upon

all reality, since it influenoes man.

Here, too, there is no

hesitation about man's ability to know the essence of things.
Plato definitely states that the nature of reality beyond man
is suoh and SQoh.

The definite character of man's relation

to reality beyond him is determined by his own nature and the
nature of that reality.

Of oourse, to inquire into Plato's

conception of the nature of God and the physical universe is
beyond our soope here.

We have tried to consider all the

['------------------------------------------.
79
matter th&t referred immediately to the ethical ideal.

The

point to be made is that Plato definitely establishes his
definition of Justice on what he believes to be the nature of
things, in other words, on a metaphysical basis.
The importance of this fact for the value of the ideal
can scaroely be overestimated.

It imparts to the ideal ohar-

acter of the philosopher that stability and solidity, that
finality and oompelling force without which it would be but
another fine-spun theory.

Because it rests on this basiS,

the ideal leaves no loophole of escape for a subtle and
elusive individualism, more acourately, caprice.

The in-

dividualism it fosters is one of stern responsibility.

The

only conolusion to be drawn from a sincere examination of the
ideal is: ttlf this be true, if these be the facts, then I
must live up to this norm, lest my own life be frustrated of
its highest end. n

The only valid ground upon which the ideal

can be attacked is to say that it deals inadequately with the
nature

o~

things as these manifest themselves to experience.

This is the ground upon which succeeding philosophers have
rejected it, not entirely, but only as a final solution to the
ethical problem.

They have acoepted its many truths and

sought, in the light of reflexion, to sapply its omissions
and rectify its errors.

Even for the Christian the ideal

holds muoh of value, not as something beyond what the Christis.n ideal possesses, but as a powerful presentation of such
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t~~th

as is oommon to both Platonio and Christian thought.
The metaphysical basis of the Platonio ideal of human

perfeotion makes it diffioult for suoh writers as Norman
Foerster 58 to substantiate the olaim that their thought is
the genuine progeny of Platonism.

The autonomy of the inner

authori ty whioh they preaoh differs vastly from the Platonio
autonomy of reason.

The latter is based on the ability of

reason to know the nature of things; the former, on a diffidenoe in the power of man to know things as they are, either
his own nature or realit,y beyond him.

Plato wanted the fount

of moral aotion to De the ordered interior of the individual,
and its ohiefest

reward~,

peace and righteousness of soul.

But he never olaimed that the satisfied oonsoienoe is anything more than a manifestation of oonformity to the nature
of things.

Conscienoe neither oreates nor ultimately ratifies

the essential reotitude or depravity of human aotions.

In

partioular oases, it is true, even a mistaken oonsoienoe (provided one does not know that it is mistaken) is to be followed, in the event tha. t no other souroe of" informa tion is to be
had.

The obligation to follow even a mistaken oonsoienoe,

however, does not oonoern the intrinsio morality of the aot,
but only the disposition of tha agent.

A mistaken oonsoienoe

is no measure by whioh to form general norms.

The untainted

oonsoienoe is a witness and expression of the law of man's
nature and derives all its binding force from this souroe.

-----------------------------------------------------------------1
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The ideal of the philosopher presents the true
manistic dualism most clearly.

hu-

We suggested in our introduo-

tion that ordered power as opposed to indiscriminate intensity
is the humanistio ideal of action.

Babbitt's ethical ideal

illustrates this; so too does that of

p~re

Longhaye, as we

shall see; but neither, so clearly as that of Plato.
To understand how this is true, it will be best to
follow the genesis of the dualism of Plato's ethical ideal.
We must turn aside for a moment to View, sketchily of course,
the dualism of the PbaedQ.

Here we find the condemned

Socrates insisting on a dualism between body and soul whioh
1'1

....

in some aspeots approaches the CTW,AA.c:4 cr'YJ ~cJ..
dootrine of
the Orphios. 59 The body is depioted as the great obstacle to
the life of philosophy, and death welcomed as deliverance
from this impediment.

We oannot understand the real advanoe

over the Orphio ideas, oontained in the dualism ot the Phaedo,
unless we note several pOints of Socrates' stand.

First, as

Paul Blmer More says,GO even here as early as the Phaedo
Plato did not. mean by "body" merely the flesh, but the entire
host of blind unreasoning desires of whioh man is oonsoious.
Indeed, in the Phaedo these desires are assooiated most
closely wi th the flesh.
from this association.

But Plato was gradually drawing away

paul Elmer More is justified, in

saying that the intense asceticism of the Phaedo
passing phase of Plato's thought.

is but a

This view is verified in
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the dualism of the Republis.

The seoond point to be notioed

is the introduotion of knowledge into the idea of dualism.
The body is the great hindranoe to knowledge, and freedom
from its thralldom will

en~ble

the soul to attain true wisdom.

Lastly, we must notioe that the oharges preferred against the
body are based upon a preferenoe for unity and control in
life as opposed to the multiplioity and looseness of organization charaoteristio of the life of the senses.

The desires

assooiated with the flesh are many, inter-oonflioting, insatiable; the desire of the soul, one and all-su1'i.ioing.

The

senses can give but contaot with the reality of partioulars;
the knowledge whioh the soul needs is unified and universal.
We shall see these points finally developed and olarified in
the RepuDlio.
The new and generous appreciation of the body is
perhaps the most striking point of the dualism of the Republio
as oom9ared with that of the Phaedo.

It is not too much to

say that the opposition to the flesh as suoh has oomple tely
disappeared.

Plato no longer looks upon the body as a prison

and an impediment, but as a positive aid to the soul in its
ascent to fulness of life.

In the system of education he

sketohes, gymnastios, whioh is to train the body to harmony,
graoe and proportion, not for its own sake, but for the soul,
holds an important plaoe.

The proper disposition of the body

oan prepare the way for the soul's ascent, and the physioal
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harmony of the body beoomes an image and refleotion of the
harmony of the soul. From oPPosition Plato turns to eooperation. 6l He has eome to realize that the flesh as suoh is
capable of no evil.

Eaoh faoulty, in tending relentlessly

roward satisfaotion, is but folloWing the law of nature.
shall reprove the eye with seeing?

Who

To gain unity in life

the soul must not seek to escape the body but must itself
unify life by the exeroise of oontrol and direotion over the
activity of the whole man.
Consequently) in the Republic the struggle is no longer
between body and soul, but within the soul itself, between the
rational and oonoupisoent elements.

The aim of this oonfliot

is to reduce the oonoupisoent element to submission to reason,
and not to exterminate desire.

The oontrol whioh reason is

to exeroise over desire is emphatically not a mere curb or
inhibiting influence, as Paul ~lmer More would have it,62
but a direotive and coordinating foroe as well.

Limitation

of aotivity, whether by preference of one power to another or
by restraint of the intensity of the aotivity of a single
faoulty, is oertainly a part of oontrol; but it is a minor
part, since the normal activity of the whole man is necessary
for happiness.
In the Republio, however, we find no ohange in Plato's
attitude toward the soul and the senses as organs of knowledge.

The dualism of knowledge and opinion in the Republio
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oarries on the similar opposition of the Phaedo.

The solution

of the problem of universal ideas and sense-knowledge leaves
reason autonomous in its perception of essence.

The knowledge

of the senses is not repudiated as false, but as insuf:ricent.
The knowledge of the autonomous reason is preferred oecause
of it s uni versali ty and certi tude, the necessary conditions
for unity and control in lite.
It is clear from this, that the real dualism, to
Plato's mind, exists not between body and soulJor between
reason and desire wi thin the soul, but between uni ty and
control, as opposed to multiplicity and unrestraint, in life.
Consequently, the elements of man's nature are conceived as
opposed to one another as they make either for unity and
control or multiplicity and unrestraint: reason is opposed
to desire, the soul to the body, "nous" to the sensesJas unifying powers to elements which tend to
straint.

di~ion

and unre-

The philosophic character is built about the idea

of order in power, the core ot humanism.
Although Plato's rather importunate introduction of
divinity into the scheme may cause some readers annoyance,
we must reoognize this insistence as his constant testimony
to the fact that religion is an essential element in man's
nature and must oe accounted for in any adequate ethics.

The

ethical ideal Plato envisaged was a state of perfection for
man conformable to his nature, and religion must have a cen-
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tral plaoe in the ideal.

He oould not oountenanoe the tradi-

tional religion of his day, so he settled the matter as he
thought it must be settled.
unsatisfaotory.

His solution, in its detail, is

Ii we oonsider the oircumstances under which

he labored, his ideal on the whole needs little apology.
point to be emphasized is that he realized the need

o~

ion in life and sought to give it its rightful plaoe.

The

religHow

this can be.said to impugn the humanity of his ideal, it is
difficult to see.

On the oontrary, the ideal becomes more

human because of the p1aoe given the divine.

It acoounts

more fully fo r the faots of our nature than any ideal whioh
ignores religion in the name of humanity.

Certainly, if the

basic motive force behind all humanism De the desire to realize all the potenCies of human nature, Plato deserves a
place almost without peer among the truest humanists.

The

nan who sets out to erect a "humanistic" ethics without God,
religion and the supernatura1 63 is Simply using words recklessly and, what is worse, misinterpreting human nature recklessly.

We do not mean to say,

of~ ~ourseJ

that Plato entertain-

ed any idea of the supernatural ideal of life as Christian
revelation discloses it to mankind.

But he emphatioally did

not preclude it from among the possibility of man's nature.
On the contrary, as we noted above, the predication of divinity of "nous" ma, even be legitimately interpreted to mean
that Plato reoognized in an obsoure way the basic apptitude

86

of man's distinctive power, reason, to act on a higher level
than the natural plane of its aotivity.
power in man is to

~ecognize

And to recognize this

the natur.al basiS for the super-

natural, the factor that makes'

the supernatural truly an

elevation and not a substi tution of human nature.

An ideal

which deliberately exoludes this power from among those of
man's nature has no more right to olaim the title nhuman" in
the full significance of the word.
Even though we cannot acoept Plato's ideal as it
stands, we must reoognize its worth and nobility.

It refuted

the sophistry of his day; it is an answer of more than twothousand years standing to the sophistry of our own times.
Aldous Huxley64 and his class are confounded before they speak
for' one who knows the PlatoniC ideal. So too, is Walter
pater. 65 And the reckless use of "PlatoniC" to designate
every vapid idealistic nostrum for the ills of humanity, is
one of the long standing injustices in the history of human
thought.
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CHAPTER IV

GEORGES LOJ::TGHAYE
.AND THE IDEAL OF CHRISTIAN HOMAIH5¥

The remark of Frank Jewett Mather, Jr., that a religion whioh is a mere appendage to a system of ethios is
little worthy of the name and that a virile Christianity
ooulQ dispense with humanism, holds much truth and an equal
amount of error. l

Both the truth and the error of the remark

spring from his u.se of the word "humanism. n

He uses this

word only as it is applioable to the Amerioan humanism of our
own day.

Henoe his conoeption of humanism as an independent,

self-subsisting ethical system; henoe, too, the truth of the
remark about religion as a mere appendage to suoh a system.
Indeed, it is just the kind of humanism which sets up an independent moral ideal and oode that Christianity oan, rather
must, dispense with; Christianity has its ethics.

The error

of the remark lies in rilather's tacit assumption that his use
of the word exhausts its meaning; so, oy declaring Christianity above or beyond this humanism he implies (and elsewhere
states explicitly) that it is irreeoncilable with the very
notion of humanism.

Nothing could be more mistaken.

Chris-
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tian humanism is a fact, an ideal which lives today.
Christian humanism has as legitimate a title to the
anpellation as any other claimant.

Even more, it more per-

fectly realizes the common aim of all humanism: an ideal of
life which realizes man's proper perfection.

This is true

even if we accepted Bremond's opinion that the radical note of
all humanism is the glorification of human nature.

The glory

Cl'ristian humanism ascribes to human .na ture is the glory God
Himself ascribes to it.
blossoming of all the

Christian Hurne.nism desires the

~otencies

of man to the perfection God

intended in creating man.
This is the humanism represented by the author we are
about to study: Georges Longhaye, of the Society of Jesus.
While almost our contemporary, he is the direct descendant
in thought and ideals of culture of the long line of Christian humanists from Da Feltre through Salmeron, Ledesma and
Richome, and has guarded intact his heritage, even adding to
it from the riches of his own personality and experience.
The ideal he represents in his life and in his writings may be
summed up briefly as that of the cultured Christian leading
the life of faith to the full.
It may seem remarkable that so apparently unpromising
a title for our purpose as the "Belles-Lettres" has been
chosen from among Longhaye's.volumes.

In what way, one might

ask, does it enshrine the ethical ideal of Christian h1.lman-
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ism?

The answer is not far to seek.

basic conception of literature.

It lies in Longha.ye' s

The literary art, to his

mind, is "l'art d'exercer

sur l'homme par la parole une
aotion morale, puissan 1e et ordon~e. n 2 We know from the teaching of philosophy that an effect never exceeds its cause,
and that a cause always produces an effect "sui simile. n
is not otherwise in literature.

It

The moral effect produced

will be as the moral stature of the cause.
behind the word that makes literature.

It is the man

Unless we pierce

through the letter to the man we can never grasp more than
surfaoe truth.

A knowledge of an author's view of life and

man is neoessary for a true grasp of his work.

"La clef de

tout system litteraire est l'id6e m&me qJon si fait de
l'homme. n3 ~!any besides Longhaye will grant this, partly.
But few will go with him to the logioal conolusion.

Since

the ideal of human life and conduot is one and universal in
its moral aspeots, only one type of man can write truly great
literature, the man whose life realizes or approximates the
true ideal.

So, Longhaye rightly maintainS, to study liter-

ature is to study man, and to ereot, philosophioally, a literary ideal is to oonoern oneself necessarily with the moral
ideal of life. 4 The Belles-Lettr~ is, above all, philosophioal.

Its aim is the ereotion, or better the

of the true ideal of literature.

disoover~

It is necessarily conoerned,

consequently t with a moral id eal of life, and this ideal is
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the ideal of the Christian humanist.
Indeed, the elaboration of this ideal is not so complete as we might wish.

But the deficiency is amply com-

pensated by Longhaye's statement that the principles underlying all his thought are those of the scholB.stio, and espeoially Thomistic, philosophy,5 and the teaching of the Catholic Church.

Drawing on these souroes we may hope to bring

the ideal to satisfactory fullness.
Morality, writes Father Longhaye,6 is the regulation
of the free aots of man toward his last end.

Within the

compass of this short sentenoe is paoked the whole philosophio
basis of the ideal of human life and oonduot whioh stands
behind the Belles-Lettres.

Its analysis is all that is neoes-

sary to the elaboration of that ideal.

In prefaoe, however,

we may remark that the strong point of the ideal is the oognizanoe it takes of man's nature.

It is not designed for

human nature, but deduoed from it, as it manifests itself
upon philosophio refleotion.

The ideal is realistio in the

best sense of that muoh abused term, that is to say,it is
based on the truth of things as they are.

This aooounts for

the two notes most oharaoteristio of the ideal.

By thus sink-

ing its foundation to the bed rook of human nature it is made
impregnable to every attaok save a negation of the oonoeption
of human nature upon whioh it rests.
detail here.

There is no question of

If the natare of man is what sound philosophy

...------------------------------------------------------1
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teaohes it to be, all that follows logioally must be granted.
The issue is essentially philosophioal.

Moreover, this ideal

oombines the statio and dynamio elements of life, for it is
at onoe a metaphysio, (that is, based on metaphysios) and a
disoipline.
The term, "last end" (fin derniere) may well serve as
the point of departure in the analysis of this definition.
The faot that all aotivity is teleologioal is a datum of
universal experienoe.'

The bird which appears among us in

due season, and, seleoting the proper crotch

in the proper

tree, proceeds with unerring instinct to gather just the
proper material needed for its own kind of nest, is an exampLe
common enough to bring the fact home clearly to everyone.
A similar phenomenon greets the biologist in his laboratory.
The teleologioal natllre of embryonic development is a marvel
of preoision and unerring ooordination of parts to a oommon
end when the aotivity of development is normal.

It is in

itself a devastating oonfutation of meohanistic and tropistio
theories.

Inanimate nature shares this oharaoteristio, as

sCienoe shows.

But it is most apparent in the human act,

because man is conscious of this aspect of his nature.
Indeed, we may state unequivocally that aotivity
manifests intelligence.

The intelleot which guides action

need not be present in the agent, but is always connected
wi th the agent by the positive influenoe whioh exists be'tween
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the oause and its proper efteot.

This maybe illustrated by

the example ot the diverse aotivities in man.

The human body

obeys all the ohemioal and physi oal laws of life, not by the
deliberate choioe of the individual, but instinctively, naturally, because God so oonstruoted it.

The intelligenoe be-

hind its aotivity is the Divine Intelligenoe guiding, so to
speak, the oreative divine will.

So, too throughout nature

aotivity proclaims the existence of Divine Intelligenoe.

Man

has another field of activity, however, over whioh he himselt
exercises dominion in virtue ot free will.

He mayor may not

do oertain things, and the intelligenoe whioh iwnediately
guides his ohoioe is his own.

The proper human aotions are

deliberate and oonsoious, that is, man knows the end of the
aotion and his

o~

power ot self-determination in regard to

it.
This consciousness of purpo se and freed.om is the
specific difference between the aoti vi ty of man and that of
all other oreatures and places man in a sphere peouliar to
himself.

When the bird builds its nest, and the seasons

change, the activity is oarried on in blind ooedienoe to an
imnlanted nature, and for an end unknown to the bird or to
the elements.

They cannot do otherwise; their aotivity de-

serves neither praise nor blame; their aotivity is oomplete
and perfeot in the fulfilment ot the immediate end.

In the

distinotive human aot, however, the reverse is the case: the

9'1

aotivit7 inherently deserves reward or punishment; the end of
the distinotively human faoulties, will and intellect, is
never merely immediate, but also ultimate.

That is to say,

.an is responsible for his aotions; and the intelleot and will
are truly frustrated unless they serve the ultimate purpose
o! the whole.

Man must, at least in the last analysis, aot

toward an ultimate and human end, an end beyond which there is
nothing and which is eminently suited to human nature.
The necessity of so acting is imposed upon him by his
nature t which, beoause it is 1mmutable, God Himself cannot
change. 8 Because man is intelligent he oannot rest Short
o! the ultimate good of" his nature; because he is free, he
is responsible for the attainment of that good.

Reflection

shows him that in every action he is drawn to act by the desire to obtain or effect something which he apprehends as
suitable to himself.

It also shows him that the good of the

whole is imperative even tor the proper satisfaction of the
part, oecause a part, from its very nature, cannot thrive
truly and permanently if the whole is frustrated of its
end.

So the element of disorimination is introduced into

human activity.

The man who follows reason will not rush

headlong to the attainment or effecting of everything which
elioits his action, but will aSk whether the satisfaction
of the instant and the part will advance or hinder the permanent satisfaction of the whole; and conversely, thus consider-
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ing, he will envisage more and more olearly a good whioh will
at onoe satisfy the whole, as a whole and in every part.
mind peroeives the infinite and ultimate good.

And his will,

limitless in its hunger for the good, follows after.
this ultimate good is perceived it must be willed.
must love the highest when we see it."

His

Onoe
"We needs

And like Guinevere,

man blinds himself, or everts his attention to oontent himself with anything less, at the oost of inevitable frustration
and woe. 9 That this ultimate end must be human, in the sense
that it eminently befits human nature as filling and satisfying its tendencies and capacities, is obvious.

Effort toward

any lesser end is repugnant to reason.
The conclusion that man's activity must be directed
to an ultimate end whioh is the fulfilment of his whole nature
opens up the further question of the nature of the last end
itself.

This new question presents two avenues of approach,
the subjeotive and the objective. lO What can the nature of

man, studied in itself, tell us of what his last end must De?
What light can facts external to man throw upon this matter?
Let us try to follow these leads in turn.
The question of the nature of man's last end is the
Simplest and most subtle that can present itself to the human
mind.

Any ohild, any savage, any SIlper-oultured devotee of

all the muses will agree in the simple response, ttRappiness."
Every philosopher has been drawn to this as to the ultimate
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question of his sCienoe, and many a fair philosophio bark has
gone to pieoes on the reefs which lurk beneath the apparently
quiet waters of this inquiry.

Happiness is indeed the answer.

AS Pascal says: "L'hormne veut ~tre heureux, et ne veut etre

quI heureux, et ne peut ne vouloir pas

l'~tre."

But this

answer only deepens the question.
The main implioation of the word "happiness" is satisfaotion.

We are happy when we are satisfied, or, more

accurately, to be happy we must be satisfied.

But not every

satisfaotion can be said to bring happiness.

Some satisfao-

tions oause what might almost be oalled pain beoause, it
would appear, there oan be too muoh satisfaotion, but, of
oourse, never too muoh happiness.

The oommon-plaoe "too muoh

of a good thing" hints at a deeper signifioation than is
usually asoribed it.

The notion of goodness, when brought

into the oonsideration, opens a new vista of thought.

The

essential note of goodness is suitability, and this enoompasses both the idea of fUlfilment and proportionateness.
Satisfaotion may be present where suitability is not, and the
remllt is the surfeit we haTe noted.

The appalling appetite

of a ohild for sweets is really being sa tisfie'd even when
indulged far beyond what is suitable and good for him as a
whole.

The satisfaotion whioh brings happiness must be,

ther~

fore, at onoe tull,and proportionate to the capaoity of the
reoipient, oonsidered as a whole.

Man's happiness will oon-

,---------------------------------------------------------------.
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s1st in the possession of a good which satisfies oompletely
and proportionately all the oapacities and potencies of' his
nature oonsidered as a whole.
appears.

At this point a seeming paradox

Proportion implies, at least negatively, moderation,

and moderation is against the human spirit at least in its
present state.

I think it useless to deny this last, for the

real solution lies in the fact that nothing less than the
possession of the highest and best, as completely as yossible,
oan really satisfy human nature fully and proportionately.
The satisfaction of each individual potenoy of human
nature brings its proper delight, quiesoenoe in the possession
of some good.

But it is easily perceived that the satisfac-

tion of anyone capacity can. never bring happiness.

Neither,

on the other hand, can the satisfaction of all the potenoies,
if this be achieved for them as individual and separate entitieS. .
w~nt.

To satisfy one potency alone would leave a gaping

Fully to satisfy each one individually and separately

would bring confusion and discord, for the full satisfaction
of one at times conflicts with that of another.

Happiness,

then, oan only be had when man possesses that good whioh
satisfies the prinoipal tendenoy of his nature primarily, and
every other tendenoy in proportion as each subserves the full
satisfaotion of the.principal.

Subordinate ooordination is

the rule of happiness in man's life.

This alone assures that

fulness and proportionateness in thB satisfaction of his whole
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nature whioh is the oondition of happiness.

Happiness, whioh

is the last end of man, subjeotively oonsidered, that is, the
last end whioh his nature indioated, may be defined as the
conscious possession of the highest good.
Objeotively considered the Last end of man is God,
simply beoause there is nothing else adequate to the

r~le.

All the; arguments for this identifioation hinge on the faot
that man's last end must be something whioh will satisfy
adequately, permanently, proportionately all the potenoies and
needs of human nature.

Every system whioh denies or ignores

this identifioation is unsatisfactory beoause it fails to
appreciate man.

But in approaohing this oonsideration it

seems neoessary to oaution a oonstant awareness of several
faots if we are to appreoiate the stand of the Christian
humanist.

The Christian humanist as suoh does not consider

it incumbent upon himself to prove the existenoe of God.

His

philosophy does so, indeed; mlt his faith disposes of the
matter even more conclusively.

secondly, his philosophy

teaches that happiness oonsists in the possession o:t a oonorete
good.

Lastly, that an argument from the nature of' Gdl, serves

complementary-wise as an argument from human nature, sinoe
this last is oontingent on the former.
The last end of man must be identified with God, beoause God is what He is; and this is to say, conoomitantly,
beoause man is what he is.

Consoious of His own perfeotion,
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God oould not, without betraying His own nature, oonstitute
aIlything ot1:3r than Himself as the ultimate good and oonnatural end of all oreation and, therefore, of man.

To do other-

wise would be to aot inordinately, whioh, in turn, would be
a violation of His supreme sanctity and perfeotion/whioh
demands that all His external aotivity manifest the supreme
and essential order of things.ll
A further reason for this identifioation is adduoible
and one that is, perhaps, more oompelling oeoause it affeots
more olearly man's own interest and happiness.

Only in God

is that perfeot good whioh the mind oonoeives and the will
reaohes out for as capable of perfectly satisfying human
nature as a whole and all its parts proportionately, realized.
The mind oonoeives this perfeot good after the experienoe of
lesser goods, as oombining in itself all the perfeotion and
sppetibilities of this latter without its limitations and
confliots.

This perfeot goodness oan be predioated only of

God, beoause the whole reality, and oonsequently goodness and
sppetibility, of every objeot oonsists in its imitation of the
Divine perfeotion.

The perfeotion, goodnas and appetibility

of eaoh, therefore, is found in Him supremely, eminently,
flawlessly, intensified, and He shines forth as the "unam
ultimum, omnino desiderabile" of man's will, in the possession
of whioh alone is happiness and rest. 12
The foregoing disoussion may seem to have led us into
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a metaphysioal darkroom, in whioh the original question is
entirely lost sight ot.

Granted all that has been said, how

does it affeot the ideal ot individual development we started
out to oonsider?

The answer is: direotly.

These metaphysioal

oonsiderations lead to a very praotioal oonolusion: lite must
be organized acoording to those considerations if it is not to
be frustrated.

The subordinated ooordination whioh, we saw,

is neoessary to human happiness, when translated into action,
means,tor Father Longhaye, the reoognition and maintenanoe ot
the essential

hierar~hy

among the faoulties of man.

The basis ot the essential hierarohy ot faoulties upon
which Father Longhaye lays suoh stress 13 is, first of all,
psyoho10gioal.

When considered psycho10gioally, as a matter

of faot, it leaves us oold.

But when we come to oonsider it

in the light of the attainment of the end ot our existenoe,
funotionally, so to speak, and morally, we peroeive that it
is the natural and neoessary foundation of the fruitful life.
The aoademio aspeot of the question vanishes, giving way to a
very personal interest.

One oan quite dispassionately oonsid

or nonoha1antly waive aside (as temperament prompts) the
problem of formal oolor.

When brought into a true perspective

of things, it really doesn't matter where oolor is.

But it is

a question of tremendous moment whether or not one is responsible for one t s aot ionsj whether the head or heart must rule
life for the greatest }:l.appiness.

It is thus that the hier-
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archy of faoulties is oonsidered, as olosely bound up with
the moral question, the question of the attainment of the last
end.

Psychological disoussion, save what is absolutely neces-

sary to a olear understanding of terms, is out of due order
here.

"Essential tf hierarchy may best be taken here as essen-

tial to the attainment of the goal of life.

The rule of sub-

ordina ted coordina ti on ho lds sway, and we sa.y tha t faoul ty
is essentially nobler and more to be respected which makes
most directly for the last end, or upon the action of which
the last end depends.

Vie may, oonsequently t speak of a sub-

jective and an objective, of a moral, a.l cultural, and psychologioal priority among the faculties.
Father Longhaye's hierarchical scheme rests upon the
dualistic conception of man as consisting of body and soul.
The faoul ~i es can, therefore, De divided accordihg as they
derive from or pertain principally to the soul or the body,
or to both at once.

We say principalll pertain or derive,

because the actions and. funotions in this life are all)to
some extent, of the oomposite.

The spiritual faculttBs. in-

telligence and Will, pertain to the soul, though extrinsically
conditioned in aotion by the body.

The senses are of the

body, though animated and vitalized by the soul.

Lastly,

sensi bili ty and imagination blend, as it were, the two - oody
and soul - and oan be said to pertain wholly and only to the
composite.1 4 The prinoiple of subordination, we have said,
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is tu.notional and moral, that is, funotional with regard. to
the last end of man.
The intelleot is essentially superior to the imagination and the senses beoause ideas are "per se tt universal and
oonoerned with essenoes.

The senses and the imagination are

bound up essentially and wholly with the partioular and material.

The intelleot, .ithout violating or denying the partio-

ular and the ph7sioal, transoends them, pieroing through to
the essenoe and by abstraotion molding the intentional universal.

It thus gives man a grasp of the wider truth and allo-

oates him more dominantly in reality.

It is only by the

knowledge .a! universal essenoes, suoh as goodness and the like
that man oan oome to understand his last end, the attainment
of whioh alone oan bring him happiness.

Consequently the

priority of intelleot is valid, neoessary, and essential. 15
A parallel superiority establiShes the supremaoy
the will over sensibility.

o~

The one is essentially spiritual,

the other a great part flesh and blood.

Not that this last

faot essentially degrades sensibility.

It rather lays sensi-

bility open to a oertain instability oonnatural to the fleSh.
By the will man is made master, and oontrols; by sensibility
he suffers and undergoes the movements of repulsion and attraction passively.

As Fr. Longhaye wrote,

---l'une est libre, l'autre est tatale. Ie
puis empeoher l'impression de prevaloir et de
me dieter ma oondulte; Je ae puls l'emp'oher 4e
naitre et d'emouvolr.-

J
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The first clause of thi s oontrast refers to the work
will, the second to that of sensibility.

of

the

In the orientation

of life toward the last end, the will is the power which serw
man far better than feeling.

When the intellect has brought

light to his soul, he wills the orientation of his life toward
the proper end.
he

is~nsibly

Ultimately, it matters very little whether

drawn or repelled by that end, though to be so

drawn is a great help.

If life were left to the guidance of

sensibility a revulsion from the law of morality might wreck
the only chance of happiness.

The direction of life is a

task for the stronger, more stable and dispassionate faculty
of man, which is the will. 16
In neither oase, however, is there any hint of a
fundamental and essential opposition oetween the higher and
the lower powers.

The end of all is oommon; they differ in

ability to attain that end beoause the lower powers need the
direction of the higher.

This is subordinated coordination

among the powers, a characteristic which the perfect man
shares with all creation, in which
ttles etres infE!rieurs sont unis aux plus hauts
pour concourir en sous ordre a la fin commune.
Ainsi l'imagination est pour aider l'intelligence,
la sensi bili te, pour servir 1a vol 0 n:te. tt17
This analysis of the philosophio basis of Fr.
Longhaye's ideal should help to visualize more clearly the
goal toward which the (!hrist1an Humanist is working.

But we

must not take the parts discovered in analysis for the whole.
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It is the synthesis of these

~arts

as they exist in the mind

of the Christian Humanist which is the real ideal.

The

Christian llumanistenvisages the oomp1ete, proportionately
developed oharacter, poised, assured, dominant over life beoause his principles of action are founded on a rea1i ty.

The

parts of this whole are not of value apart from the synthesis.
The Christian Humanist is not the lover of any part for its
own sake, but of all the parts for and in the whole.

He wants

not a man who lives oy mechanical laws; who would look for a
mathematical precision in the ba1anoe and proportionate development of powers; lumbering through life, as it were, like
a great machine.

He desires a man who lives in the light of

the splendor of the whole, whose aotion is that of a vital
organism, jealous of its own life and perfection, compliant
and adaptable to all Circumstances, not through weakness, but
in pursuit and for the furtherance of its own perfection.

It

is the perfection of the whole whioh is sought, and the fUll
perfeotion.

Therefore the Christian Humanist refuses to ex-

aggerate the worth of anyone aspeot of his nature, or on the
other hand, to retrench from the fullness of his nature's
perfection by a false humility.
He maintains that the full and proportionate development of man's nature is synonymous with happiness.

He re-

oognizes that happiness is not a word which oan be defined in
terms of the here and now without negleoting and frustrating
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the finest and highest possibilities of human nature.

The

moral issue, therefore, even on purely philosophical grounds,
become s predominant in his mind.

By the moral issue he means

the regulation of his life to the attainment of the full development and happiness which his nature oraves.

Reason and

faith tell him that in its pure idea, his nature oan only be
fully satisfied by the possession of God, in the exercise of
that supernatural life, the potenoy for which is oonnatural
to his essenoe.

He does not seek to stop short, in a mis-

guided humility, and blind himself to the full truth.

God has

deigned to offer him the means of actuating this potency for
supernatural life, through Christ.

The Christian Humanist

gladly and gratefully avails himself of this offer because he
is true to the basic idea of all humanism: the fullness of
life for man.
Nevertheless he is not so fond, in his idealism, as
to lose sight altogether of the hard facts of the aotual oontingenoy.

He recognizes that, just as he is, man is capable

neither of completely maintaining the hierarchy of powers, nor
of living the supernatural life necessary to his full perfeotion.

It has been well said that humility is at the basis

of all ethios, and the reoognition of these humiliating facts
is the basis of Christian Humanist10 ethios.

For the Chris-

tian Humanist, (who, except for the recognition of these
faots, would be on a l.eve 1 with the humanistio posi ti vist and
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agnostio), there is only one answer and solution, only one
way to the attainment of his goal: the full perfeotion of his
nature, is Christ, in Whom he sees God's own solution and remedy for the plight of man, and the path He has pointed out to
the attainment of the perfeotion for which He destined human

nature i.n oreating it.
What has been outlined here is but the philosophio
basiS of Christian Humanism.

But its real soul is in the

Christocentric aspect. iheChristian Humanist. looks upon humani\j
philosophically, and sees in outline the potential beauty of
1ts full stature; he looks upon it, as it is, and sees its
impotence to aohieve its perfection of itself; he looks upon
Christ and sees in Him, and in the way of life He teaches, at
once the full appreciation of the possibilities, of human
nature and the strength to overcome its present disabilities.
Only then can he cry out with Shakespeare, "How beauteous is
mankind," but adding the significant olause. "since redea.ed
by (Jod made man and raised 'by grace to supernatural perfec-·

tion. II
II
When Irving Babbitt wrote that humility is the base
ot all true and sound ethiCS. he very probably did not appreCiate the full import of his statement.

At least, it is

oapable of a deeper meaning than the one he ascribed it. and
this deeper meaning Christian Humanism perceives as the only
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true one.

The humility Babbitt has in mind was the moral in-

dolenoe he believed is an inherent weakness of human nature.
The humility at the base of Christian Humanism is the humility
that takes aooount of original sin, and differs from
as a cause differs from a

~abbitt's

sympto~.

We noted that the Christian Humanist, though a man of
an ideal, is not so fond as to overlook the facts of the contingenoy in which his efforts toward his ideal m11st De made.
The contingenoy will often modify, not the ideal itself, but
the attitude toward it, turning mere aspiration to a salutary
oanniness for praotical strategem for its attainment.

To say.

therefore, that the Christian Humanist takes cognizance of the
circumstances under which he must strive to realize his ideal,
is not to say that he retrenches from the loftiness of his
ideal, but merely that he sets himself to a practical solution
of the problems oonfronting him in its attainment.
is true, beoause based upon the nature of man.

His ideal

But experience

tells him that all is not as ordered as the Creator intended
it to be.

The arguments which lead him to the conolusion that

a hierarohy of faculties is natural to man and essential to
his happiness, are irrefragable.

But in actual life he sees

that this hierarohy is seldom appreCiated and maintained, beoause the very elements whioh are to be alined seem to have
no inherent tendency toward the neoessary order, but rather a
power of selfassertion, so to speak, whioh leaves war and

III

disorder where concord and subordination should reign.

This

discord manifests itself sometimes as indolenoe; sometimes
much more forcibly as perversity.

So it must be conoluded,

that some principle of disorder has been introduoed into the
human cosmos, which, like an unleashed world, tracks confusion
in its wake.
This principle of disorder cannot be something entirely outside of human nature.

Since man has free Will, only

a deliberate deflection from the law of his nature can really
confound and oonfuse his life.

But this deliberate defleotion

which alone can account for the confusion and insubordination
in man's life oannot be the work of each individual sinoe this
confusion is manifest long before the activity of responsible
ehoice begins.

In other words, it has become in a sense con-

natural, and is universal.

Therefore, this c·Jnfusion must

have been introduced by deliberate act at some time and by the
act of one of such a position in the race as to make the conse~uences

of his act the heritage

op

his posterity.

The

rational man looks for an explanation which will cover all
these facts.

The Christian Wumanist alone can find it) and he

finds it in the teaching of the Church, in a word, in the
Incarnation and all it implies.
"The theology of the Christian ltumanist, n wrote Abbe
nr~mond, "is that of the Church."

The j.ncarnation

1.S

the

central and root dogma of Christianity, and the Christian

~----------------------------------------------------------------I
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}illlna.nist attributes to the word exactly the meanina
b'T

~iven

it

the 1i vi ng Chllrch: the Second Person o'f the Holy Trinity,

true God, assumed a true human nature, and, being born of
woman, dwelt among men for their instruction and salvation.
The Christian humanist finds both the noble conception of
human nature he had formed by reason and the disorder in it
experience discovers to him, verified in the fact and implications and connotations of this dogma of the faith.

But even

more, he discovers here also the ground upon which to build
hope for the rehabilitation of man's nature, in the new life
which the Incarnation opens to man.

For not only does the

Incarnation and all it implies verify what reason and experience show, but it goes

farthe~

by pointing out the means by

which the nooility of man's nature may be reasserted and insured.
The immediate object of the Incarnation was the redemption of mankind.

Redemption presupposes a fall, and a

fall postulates the native nobility and perfection of our
nature, thereby explaining its actual disorder and

imgerfectio~

'Redemption by God further implies that the nature of the fall
was such that man could not himself regain his former status.
This is easily understood since the will is the sole instrument of deliberate action man has.

Disorder could come into

man's life only by a positive deflection of the human will
from the due order of things.

The tall must have consisted
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in the deliberate choice of

a.

lesser good at a cruoial. moment.

The result ot this choioe affected human nature somewhat as
the desertion or treason of the leader would affeot the morale

of an army.

Scattered and impaired, though not destroyed,

such a disorganized body awaits a hew force to revive its
,pristine spirit and disoip11ne.

So too human nature, disorder

ed and weakened,waited for succor.

God seems to have waited a long time before realizing

,

(the plan of the Inoarnation, to convinee men that, alone, they

fGould never brlng a bOllt the reba bill to. tlon o:t th eir nature so
essential to happiness.
ret.

Many men are not convinced of this

When man had exhausted all his resouroes in the effort

to find happiness, God offered His solution of the problem:
;Christ.
The assistanoe Christ gives: strikes at the very root
:..! our trouble.

The oentral need in the restoration of our

is the re-assertion of the snpremaoy of w1ll and

re~

These powers are degraded and debilitated by the disof sin: so that of itself reason finds 1t impossible to
sp

many things, and the will 1s unable to exercise its

roper funotion with vigor.

By His teaChing Christ brings

e neoessary light to the reason; by His graoe, new strength
o the will.

!he Incarnation i$, moreover, a heartening oonfirmaof the dignity am worth re&sondisoovers in human naturae
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God did not soorn to be man in order to save men.

The nature

He deigned to make His own is not to be despised.

Not even

the degradation of sin oould make God overlook the essential
worth of His handiwork and rest oontent to see it frustrated.
In the realization of this faot the Christian Humanist finds
the source of new oertitude, oourage, hope and strength to
bend to the task of oooperation required of him in the noble
work of re-habiliating and perfeoting his nature •
.But

the effect of Christ's partaking of our nature ts

far deeper than all thiS.

We need not enter here upon the

details of the Church's te&ehing on the Christian's life in
Christ.

Ne need only state the faot.With the coming of

Christ mankind was plaoed upon an entirely new footing toward
God.

From oreatures men have beoome the adoptive sons of God,

through their brotherhood with Christ.

The fruition of the

rights and privileges, the fulfilment of the duties of this
sonship beoomes the new destiny and life for man.

The latent

supernatural potency philosophy reoognizes in man beoomes now
an intense positive need for man.

Happiness has acquired a

new and richer meaning •. contemplating these truths, which
follow inevitably on the very notion of the Incarnation,the
Christian humanist oan say with the deepest oonviction, "How
beauteous is mankind since redeemed by God and raised to the
supernatural plane by grace. ft
From the realization of the truths which fOllow upon

IUS

• Inoarnat10n, there 1s born the noble 1ndiv1dua11sm ot the
1st1an Human1st.

It 1s an indiv1dua11sm ot personal re-

When the truths ot h1s tai th are taken out ot
he sees that they have no other t1eld ot applition than his own soul and lite.
ind1v1dual is tree trom the

'0

speoial dispensation.

It human nature has tallen.

e~eots

ot that tall. save by

It a nat1ve worth yet o11ngs to that
1t olings in eaoh 1nd1v1dual.

I

J

It

d devi sed an eoonomy to redeem the tallen human race, the
otors in that eoonomy are indiv1duals, to eaoh ot whom a
eoial and partioular applioation of' the divine plan is
This application oannot be mde without the 00the individual.

Individual, personal, willing

oooperation with the working of graoe is the
deal whioh the·· Chri etian Humani st takes for his own, true to
basio note of all humanism, the fullness ot l1fe.
only true aDl sound Christian 1nd1v1dualism,

8.

This is

personal

eaoh man's 1n see1ng that the work of Christ
\1113 brougb. t to fru1 tion 1n h1mself.
I am fully oonso10us that all this may seem the merest
, 1ati tude to manl'.

There is no better answer to those who

lWould think so than to quote Abbt Brlmond, who also was oon:Boious tha t many would be so atte ote4.
~Ca.n

He write s: trlndeed 1

it (Christian Humanism) show nothing newer and more orig-

inal?

But what more is wanted?ft

That is just it.

What more

r
rI
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e

~s

wanted?

Everything is here.

ther ideal can ofrer.

A fUlness of life which no

We may well say, what more is wanted?

III
!he i4eal of the Christian HUmanist has been impugned.

;.. ometimes bitterly, as wholly undeserving of the appellation
l'human. n
t

It is notour purpose to oarry on a polemic for it

:~'

illere.

Frankly the ideal needs no apology, onee it is under-

\

l.tood; and indeed most of its oritios, Irving Babbitt for
;;

[instance, really are a ttaoking what they do not fUlly under',tand.
~hief

We shall, however, notice, only briefly of course, the
of the eharges brought against Christian Humanism.

A

:,onsideration of these may serve to bring out the full mean:lng of the ideal.

Christian Humanism, writes one critio, with typiaLl
erioan soorn for distinctions, is a o~promiset18 And he
sts in that as though it were a devastating condemantion,
bsolutely unanswerable.

The same idea is expressed

~y

pater,

delioately, as we would expect, but quite as olearly.
aNo acoount or the Renaissance oan be oomplete without some notioe of the attempt of
oertain Italian soholars to reooncile Christianity with the religion of anoient Greece. a
he grounds upon whioh these charges are made must be oon1dered, before an answer oan be attempted.

H1stor1aLlly,

''these ori tios maintain that Christian Humanism does not make,

-
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its appearanoe until

a~ter

the real glory of the Renaissanoe

had begun to wane, and even then it appeared, not as an indigenoUS bloom, so to say, but as a reactioD.,cn 'bone hand, to the
sensualist aspeot of the Renaissance, and on the

othe~

as a

concession to the new freedom the Renaissance had brought into
life.

The reaction was against men like Valla, let us say,

paganism, the "reaotionaries" were wise enough to realize, is
- always a step downward in these days.

Yet these same reac-

tionaries were too much the ohildren of their times to be
willing to relinquish entirely the new and wider life

o~

sense experienoe opened by the Renaissance, and the liberty
held out.

The result was that general spirit of compromise,

"jesuitry", which has been the objeot of so many attaoks.

The

Ratio studiorum of the Jesuits is brought forward as the
embodiment of this spirit in

e~uO&tional

ideals.

And Paul

Elmer More brings forward the "velut officiosa mendacia
8001esiae" the Catholic doctrine of evil, as the supre.me ex. ample, in theology.

Christian Humanism in this light is the

supreme attempt to live the life of pagan Greeoe, while at
the same time retaining the benefits of the Christian dispensation.

The effort to reoonoile the two modes of life is

no longer the naive but candid effort of Pioo della Mirandola.
but the dark diplomaoy of the Sooiety of Jesus.
The misunderstandings upon whioh these notions rest
are easily peroeived.

The basio faot that the humanism of
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~emper

of mind, an attitude toward a dootrine already estab-

,lished, is not grasped.

The Christian Humanist is a man of

the Faith who takes a oerta'in view of the faots of Chris:t1ani ty, a view whioh is founded. on these faots even though it
Uffers from other attitudes toward Christian teaohing.
differs from, but must not be opposed to the
'desert, or the solitary monk of La Trappe.
Christian than the others.

Fatherso~

He
the

None is more

Eaoh of them lays particular

:.tress upon one asp eot of Christianity. acoording as temerament or graoe may lead.
.true.

But all the aspeots stressed are

The asoetic is not mistaken because the humanist is

.oorrect.

To oppose them is to misunderstand the motives im-

',pelling each.

So, too, it is wrong to treat any of them apart

:'trom the body of truth upon whioh all found their ideals of
life.

To maintain the assertion tlat Christian liuman.ism is

• oompromise one must Show positively that it adulterates the
prino~ples

·be done.

of Christianity.

This has not been done and oannot

On the oontrary, the staunoh adherenoe of the best

·Christian lCumanists to the full ideal of the Faith is manifest
'trom a oonsideration of the lite of anyone of them.
.~ian

Chris-

humanism is above all, Christian.
The historioal fallaoy involved rests on a too narrow

View of the taots.

Christian Humanism, as an historioal

::phenomenon, is emphatically not a (mere) reaotion.

It is muoh
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itruer to 88.7 tha. t 1t ls the real h:waan1sm, and the anlmallsm
'of some Renaissanoe humanlst. a straying trom the original
"

path, or better, a tall trom the original

,
he~ht.

this laat

riB the work ot men, who would haTe gone the same way in any

'age, under some pretense or other.

they made the revival ot

ancient oulture an occasion tor the expression and glorifloa,tion of their own lusts under a mask of eml ture.

the Chris-

t1an humanism exists in lts purity, 1n Da Feltre, long betore
the appearanoe of the later, less noble type; it oomes to
flower in a host of othera:Salmeron, Ledesma, Richome,
Bellarmine, and oontinues to

OUl'

9wn day in Father Longhaye

; and many more _ But we are wroDg ln startl118 as late as Pe;traroh.

!hls is to oonoede, at least by silenoe, another

'h1stori,al fallaoy. that of the barrenness of the Middle Ages
in

1deala of

ou.l~e.

: l8~idly every day.

This fallaoy is 10sill8 ground more

It is fifty years sinoe one oould write

~"

r w1 th 1mpuni ty,

1'ille' as our eulture1s with the olassloal spirit, we oan bae41J imaglne how deeply
the human mind was move"
at the Renaissanee, in the midst ot a frozen world, the
buried fire ot an01en'ti art. rose from under
the soil. ~

_.n.

Modern sCholars. as HaBk1ns and Taylor, bave disproved this
. tallaoy utterly_

What, they simply ask. of 1a11sbury, and

'others too many t6 mention?

In suoh men as these the 1deal ot

. Christian Humanism Bad already begun to show

itselt~

The

, Christian H'I1IIlanistic ldeal is as old as the :Faith and 1s its

121
.legi tima te progeny.

These misunderstandings which lead the opponents of
Christian Humanism astray arise in large part from a narrow

land mistaken view ot Christianity.
upon as the religion of the

"

Christianity is looked
..,

(J'"WPIlt (/"T/,PfJ'I

dootrine with a ven-

:g.ance, which preaches implaoable war on the flesh and 1s a
fb11ght to all earthly oeauty.

By contrast, ancient culture,

fas 1dea11zed by time, comes to be represented as a golden age

tot liberty

t

when human nature (by which 1.s often meant man's

lelma11 tyl had come into its own.
"

Christiani ty would not be true to Christ if it were

(to preach the entire ,ext1notion of the life of man's lower

-.ture.

Christ came to restore, and not to destroy.

'Church follows in His footsteps.

His

Her aim and ideal is the

.storation of order in human nature; the oomplete denial and
,estruction of nothing in man save errors of his mind and the
,.rversi ty of his will.

Christian restraint has as its aim

'only the perf.ct ion of the whole and. the supremacy of the
~1ghest,

in man's nature.

flesh as such.

Christianity does not preaoh war

It is not. so simple as to impute evil

flesh, which is but the instrument of a higher power.
It preaohes war on that disorderliness of mind and will, whioh
'elibera.tely putting as1de the f1nal end, chooses tla present
\nd apparent good

The flesh 1s an agent of evil only when 1ts

*t1sfact1on 1s sought to the negleot of that of the whole
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,e.ture.

When

Paul Elmer More writes that Platonism, as

'-,opposed to Christianity, oonsiders the oonoupisoent spir1t,

Ira ther than the flesh) as the enemy of true happ1ness, he only
J~

t~ows
t~1ew.

'1n8

how little he has grasped the true Christian point of
Of that fallaoy whioh depiets the pagan ideal as offer-

a life of liberty, fru1 tion and poise whioh Christian1 ty

;.an never gi ve. we need say nothing.

!fhe lives of those who

bave deserted the1r Christian heritage to make the 14eals and.
of paganism the springs of aotion in their lives oonfute
fallaoy. at least by the moral ineffectualness, if not
'1

the absolute depravity of their lives. Winoklemann is exenough.
!he oharge that the ideal of Longhaye and his fellows

,1olates the essential note of humanism by the introduction

t the supernatural, appears)at f1rst,qu1te plaus1ble. out, 11'1
et, pOints to a oonfusion of terms by some of those who make
e oharge, and to a oomplete misunderstanding)by all the
of Christian HumaniBm)ot the Christian dootrine inthe question.

The term ·supernatural" as used by

11 those who accept the threefold division of lite as out,'1ned by Babbitt, More, and She1'1DB.l'1, is confused I'll th 'spiri,al' and 'divine'.

Of oourse, argument 1s useless until some

ot terms is reaohed, and the effort to olear these

rms as used by the writers mentioned would be a task in it,It.

We shall attempt it in an appendix.

In

order to prove

lS8
,{the oharge of betraying human nature brought against an ideal
k
r"hich introduoes the supernatural, it would have to be shown

that in this ideal the essential nature of man would be vio].9.ted by aotivity on a supernatural plane.

Christian Humanism

1S oompletely olear of this charge.
The Catholic Churoh

te~ohes

that in being elevated to

the supernatural pl8ll8 of aotivity, the nature of' man is not
violated, but perfeoted.

By Christ's Inoarnation, the super-

natural life becomes necessary for the perfection and happine
of man.

But man,as man, is de.tined to possess the supernat-

ural end whioh becomes him as a ohild of God.
is not a new nature replacing

h~n

The supernatul'a

nature. but an elevation

of human nature to a plane of life and action to whioh it
could never attain by its own effort,- but whioh is eminently
suitable to and oompatible with the very essenoe of human
nature.

The agent nature remains intact in elevation.

It is

the human agWl~hiCh really p erforms t~e superna tura.l aot and
.t

whioh will possess the rewar4 of tlB.t aot.

1~

1ty perfects human nature by giving the distinoti vely human

,

Supernatural acti

I

faoulties, intelligenoe and Will, an essentially hlgher kind
and wider range of exerci sa than that proper to their nature
and natural aotivity.

This has been the oonstant teaching of

the Church, and the Christian Humanist aooepts it completely.
This dootrine DaS yet to be impugned by comp-etent theologians
and the aco.ptance of it tN.a Chri stlan Hamanism of the

184.

!obarges ot being untrue to human nature.
On the oontrary, an examination ot this charge males
it olear that the ideal of the Christian

~umanist

more oom-

pletely provides for the full and proportionate satisfaotion
,nci aoti vi ty of man's nature than any other the. t has be<en

proposed.

It reoognizes that every natural faoulty must play

a part in the attainment of happiness and must be satisfied
and fulfilled it happiness is to be oomplete.

It introduoes

the ideal of subordinated coordination, whioh at once does

away with a false violent dualism, and yet reoognizes the need
of discipline.

It is not impeded oy the false humility whioh

would make some shrink from an "unhuman If ideal, for it does
no t contuse the vi tal terms, "human· and • superna tural" • Abov
all. it is most solioitous of the full perfeotion at' man and
consequently may lay superior olaim to a human appeal and a
human 40 estrine •
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CON'CLUSIOB
~he

aim of thisessaYtaa originally statedJis to an-

swer the question, is humanism at bottom an ethioal or a literary issue?

The answer aeemed clear.

Its basic issue is

ethioal; the literary issue, though always present. distinctly
secondary.

The examination of the dootrines of several human-

1s'b3 oonfirmed this.
In the wri tings of two of the authors studied the moral
and ethical question was raised as the immediate and primary
issue to be dealt with.

In the third, it is presupposed that

the moral question has already been drawn out and

sett~4,

and

the literary ideal expounded follows upon a particular resolu-tion of the ethioal

~estion.

secondary to the moral issue.

The literary issue is always
As Mr. Babbitt wrote: REither

beauty oannot be defined at all, or we must say that only is
beautiful whioh seems so to the right kind of man - he whose
whole view of life is oorrect - whioh is to 8&1' that the problem of beauty is inseparable from the ethioal problem.-

Since

the problem ot beauty is the oentral issne of aesthetics, literary aesthetios included, the statement is to the point here.
Moreover, this conviction is oommon to all three ot the writers
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; studied.

Some may protest that this is to stretoh beauty on

·an ethioal raok. Father Longha1e has foreseen this objeotion.
t

and his answer is unhesitating and unoompromising.

Speaking

i

I

of those who would free art from moral obligation, and envisag-

, 1ng a oase of oonfliot between the moral and the beautiful, he

. writes:

I

en oe cas, toutes les beautes de la parole

aP~rissent,

litteraire.

P~risse

, hamaur ou de d'cence.
/

4'hesiter."

oe qu'il taut payer d'un sacrifice d'!
Qui atmet une morale n'a plus droit

It is not for us to enter the confliot.

studying faots, and this fact is

~lear:'

We are

the ethioal issue is

uppermost in the minds of these representative humanists. and
to think or treat ot humanism as primarily a literary topio,
is, oonsequently, wrong.
Yet the literary issue, aswe have said,is everlasting
for the humanist.

In the case ot the humanists whose ethioal

dootrines .ere examined the literary interest is deoidedly
to the tore.

Eaoh has propounded a theory of literature and

their literary opinions have reoeived muoh attention.

It is

a part of the aim of this essay to traoeJhowever sketchilyjthe
. relation bet.een the literary theory and the ethical teaohing

ot eaoh.

But before doing so it seems .ell to swmmarize the

latter brietly.

This summary will also help to make olear

the relation between their ethioal and literary opinions by
placing them in olose Juxtaposition.
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W1th1n the compass ot a common des1re tor the full
pertect10n ot the ind1v1dual, wh1ch was stated to be the
note ot

humanism~the

bas~r

ethical 1deals evolved by the several

thinkers cons1dered m1ght be expeoted to ditter as the views
of each vary on quest10ns essent1al to the eth1cal problem.
These, questions, orietly enumerated, are the plaoe ot n:ataphysios in eth1os; the quest10n ot dual1sm, and the re11g1ous
question.

The questions must be answered betore an ethical

ideal can be ereoted; the nature ot eth1cs demands that they
be.

It w1ll be our purpose to rev1ew the att1tnde ot each of

the wr1ters studied toward these questions in turn, and ventur
to draw some oonolus1ons touching human1sm as a whole.
~e

quest10n ot metaphys1cs torces 1tself upon the

ethioal thinker simply because he is dealing with things as
they are, with rea11ties.

He 'seeks to adJust rea11ties one to

another, and to do this in any sat18:tactor3' a.nd permanent
manner 1 tis 0 bTious tha t

he

must know the nature ot the real-

ities wlthwhioh he is dealing, and metaphysios is the scienoe
of the nature ot rea11ty.

IrT1ng Babb1tt, as we have seen,

reoognizes the metaphysical quest1on, but in contemplating its
solut1on he 1s impeded by graTe obstaoles.

!he first of these

obstaoles 1s his acceptance ot the pos1t1vist10 tenet that
only that is real which is immediately percept1ble., !h1s

lZO
• tenet closes the human mind to whole stretches of reality whi<il.
are necessary for it to know.

Babbitt argues that since we

oannot know the essences of things, we cannot hope to have an
ethics based on such knowledge.

Thus the nexus between meta-

· physi~s and ethios is broken, and ethics becomes for him an
empirioal scienoe. 'Plato and Longhaye, on the other hand,
· recognize the.neoessity of this mexus for the validity and
· oompelling force of any ethics, and are careful to build their
ethioal ideals on metaphysical bases.
ment, they differ ,widely.

Butt despite this argu-

As the realism of Plato is not the

realism of Longhaye so the ethics of Plato is not that of
Longhaye.

It is beyond the scope of a. brief r6sume to enter

into these

dif~erences.

The important thing tQ notioe is that

they are both realists, that is, both recognize that the nat
of things oan be known, and must form the basis of a satisfactory ethics.
The difference of doctrine between positivistio and
realistic humanism affeots very deeply the idea.l of life eaoh
offers.

The ideals based on realistic philosophy have a oom-

pelling force wholly lacking to the positivistic ideal.

If

. an ideal is founded upon the evident nature of things no reasonable man can excuse himself from conformity and assent to
that ideal.

He may deny that this or that particular ideal

of life, whioh purports to be founded upon the absolute nature
of things, interprets and represents that reality adequately.
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BUt even in that supposition the basio truth is maintained;
one who denies the adequaoy

o~

a given ethioal ideal implioit

admits that if the ideal is based on reality he must conform
, to it, since, by his own admission, the only reason why he oan

i

,'exempt himself from oonformi ty is that the ideal itself does
not square with the truth of things.

In the face of this

, charge the question shifts and is no longer ethioal but purely
metaphysioal, and the ethios will bind just in so far as it
can be demonstrated to be based on the evident nature of
. things.

An

ethios based upon a positivistio philosophy is

never compelling.

A really reasonable man will rejeot it tor

the very reason that so many readily accept- it: its flexibili
and its allowanoe for the tree play of individuality.

He sees

tha t posi ti vism make s ethics a. man's pri va. te property. a dootrine, though inviting, yet false and dangerous.

Its flexi-

bilityjwhioh springs from its laok of oontaot with the nature
of things, degrades positivistic ethios to moral opportunism.
Thus the same conolusion is again foroed upon us: ethics must
be based upon the nature of things.

On this we may venture

to conclude that only the humanism of the realist can aohieve
satisfaotorily the aim 01' all humanism: an ideal of life and
oonduot whiohwill provide for the full and proportionate
development of man's nature.
perhaps the most outstanding oharaoteristio of the

...~

·tbree ideals considered, when stu4.ied comparatively, is
oommon note ot dualism.

tll.l~

Irving Babbitt builds his whole

structure on the immediate pereeption ot a -Higher Will" able
to control expansive desire.

The most

prominen~practioal

function attributed to "nous· in Plato's ideal is the guidance
and regulation of the concupiscent element ot the soul, and
oonsequently ot the destiny of the whole man.

Father

dualism is apparent in his very detinition ot morality as -the
direotion ot the!£!! acts toward the tinal end."
All are agreed that the faot of dualism is the basis
of all ethics.

All, further. are in acoord in holding that

the ethioal aspect of dualism is an opposition of oontrol to
unrestraint in the oonduot of lite.
allooation

ot~the

power

o~

.ivergenoe oomes in the

oontrol and in the cbLracteristics

assigned it.
Babbitt is forced by his epistemological difficulties
into a strained auL unnatural position.
a consequence. strikes one as

b.i~

The Higher Will, as

very arbitr,ary.

It rules

like a divinely appointed lord whose aots are not open to
comment and whose oounselors (in this oase Babbitt's ·standards") are ma4.e to feel that their counsel is merely advioe.
This trait ot the "Higher Will" has earned tor its discoverer
the condemnation of voluntar.ism •. '1ithout gOing so tar as to
concur wholly in this last opinion. an etfort has been here
made to show above that his handling of tho relations between

-

l3S

intellect and will is

far from satisfaotory.

His chief. fail-

ing i8 a tendenoy to depreoiate reason, with a corresponding
inclination to exalt the nHigher .ill- unduly.
for his ideal is anything but satisfactory.

!he result

The reasonable

man cannot give his sympathy to an ideal which deals so awkwardly wi th the facts of experienoe.
Plato, on the other hand, flies to quite an opposite
extreme.

He allocates the power of control in life in an

autonomous reason.

This disposition ot the aatter is also

entirely unsatisfaotory.

It tails to account tor the most

potent factor in human nature. tree will.
this power is a faot of experienoe.

!he presenoe ot

Plato's: theory tails,

like Babbitt's, to aooount for existing taots.
Only in the third ideal studied do we find the elements
of intelleot and will harmonized and coordinated in a manner
which satisfies experience adequately_
are intelligent.

We haTe tree Will; .e

But neither will nor intellect is autonomous;

both are so oonsti tuted by nature as to require each other 1 s
oooperation.

The light ot intellect is the guide ot the tree

Will; the tree will pOSits the hUll'1&n. act.

we are oonsoious

that we oan w11l nothing absolutely W1known to us.

we are

also consoioua that the toreknowledge needed does not invalidate the free aotion ot the will in any oontingency.

!his

oooperative aotivity is manifeetlT neoessary tor unity in lite.
Consequently we may venture a second oonclusion, which

1M

(presupposing the first) may be formulated thus: only the
humanism of the realist-libertarian offers an ethics which
adequately accounts for all the facts of 'experience whioh must
be taken into account in attaoking the ethioal pro bleB.
It was stated that the motive which impels the humanist to ereot his ideal is a desire for the full development at
human nature.

No little of tlB div.rgenoebetween the ideals

we have studied derives from the different interpretations of
the phrase ftfull development of human nature. 1I

The point at

issue throughout may be reduced to a single question: the
relation of the human to the supernatural.

.l)oes the super-

natural. when introduced into an ideal of life for man, make
tha. t i'deal less h'Wl&ll, i.e./less fitting to man, as man?

Or

does it make the ideal more eminently human?
In the preface to Rousseau aDd Romantioism, we are
told that life is experienoed on three planes. the natural.
,

(whiC~

might better be oalled the an1m&l),the human and the

supernatural.

In man. acoording to Babbitt. there is essen-

tiallyan element of the purely natural, (an1mal),besides the
human element.

Therefore) be goes on)no strict line oan be

drawn between the two elements as far as the constitution of
man is conoerned.

As far as aotivity is concerned, the purely

natural aotivity must always be subJected to the distinotively
human in man.

The human level is oharaoterized by the aotiv-

1ty of the "Higher \fill".. The hu.man and the animal considered
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as one in the human composite, however,

~orm

a world in them-

selves, strictly opposed by Babbitt to the supernatural.

Now

in erecting an ideal ot conduct tor man it is obviously a
retrogression to work on a principle which in itselt is applicable to lite only in the natural level.

Likewise, according

to Mr. Babbitt, an ideal based on a prinalple ot lite on the
su.perll8. tural plane is unti tted to man.

We mu.st be careful to

do Justioe to Mr. Babbitt's stand on this pOint.

It would be

entirely mistaken to represent him as violently oppos.dte the
superll8.tural.

In his own words, it it came to a choioe be-

tween reducing lite to the natural plane and seeking to guide
lite by supernatural principles, he would rank
hesitatingly with the suparnaturalists.
not at all neoesSLrY.

himsel~

un-

But suoh a choice is

What is necessary is to attempt to

li~e

a tnll lite on a human plane, to "be human betore trying to
be superhuman."

He would have man live on a bowing acquain-

tanoe with the supernatural and the religious.
Plato takes up quite an opposite position when he
predicates divinity ot Knous" and the idea ot good.
first plaoe,he would never subsoribe to this

ot lite.

In the

three~old divisio~

Reason, he says, is
the. distinotive mark of man's
.

humanity and i.s itselt divine.

The human eannot be adequately

oonceived as separate trom the divine, and divinity is natural
to the human in the sense that it beoomes the human essentialll
When reason is supreme in lite man has reached the full pro-

136

portionate life that naturally be.ome. him and lives thi8 lite
in virtue ot a faoul ty whioh is d1 vine,.

The 41 vine 1s es-

sental, theretore, to the fall human life.
like sheer paradox, but how
Plato's wort.?

Gan

!fhis may soun4

any other meaning be taken

Reason is the distinotive

m&~k

trOll

of man's buman-

i ty (and tharetore the taoul ty whioh must be supreme in the
distinotively human lite); but reason is itself divine; therefore the full di 8 t moti ve human life has somewhat of the
divine a. part ot its eS8enoe.
ft_e1' Longhaye faoe8the problem on the ground ot:
scholastio philosophy.

Consequently

he

would oonsent to the

cradations of life that Babbitt enumerates only with qualifioations.

He would grant that there is a purely animal p18.l).e

of lite abd that tor man to guide h1s life by prinoiples ad. Justed to this plane woUld be a distinot degradation.

He Will

grant, too:, that there is a dist1l1ctive human plme of lite,
but he would not grant its opposition to the supernatural
plane.

He would distinguish.

For man to live his l1te on &

principle which only the angels, beoause of super-human qualitie., oan tollow, would be repqnant and unhuman; this he wo
grant.

But if by the supernatUl'&l plane is meant a plane ot

aotivity in whioh the distinotive human faoulties exeroise an
intense aotuation of their powera, we must aay that lite on
that piane would oertaloly be neither repugnant nor unhumaa,
but eminently becoming to man'8.nature.

AnI.

this last i.
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exaotly what thl Christian

~i8t

understands-by elevation

to the supernatural plane.

The Christian Humanist's view may be more olearlyand
positively stated thus: elevation to the supernatural oan only
be repugnant to the humanistio ideal it by moh elevation
human nature would be violated or trustrated.

Human nature

oan only be violated or trustrated it its essential and distinotive aotivitiesbe so curbed or altered that the nature·
atfeoted would no longer be human.

Suoh would be the case lf

mperuatural aotivlty meant aotivlty on the plane at the pure
spiritual, the aotlvity say, ot an angel.

If, oonsequently,

elevation to a supernatural plane does not ourtail or alter,
but it lt enhances man's distinotlve aotivities, it oannot be
a violation

o~

human nature.

It man's lite were transmuted

trom human into angell0 lif., there would be no elevation but
essential alteration.

The new lite aoquired would not neoes-

sarily be superna tura:t,"; it mlgh t be a me rely natural li fe on
a higher level ot existenoe and activlty.

Moreover, beoause

the distinotlve powers at human nature oonstitnteall that
ismaterlally necessary tor elevation to the supernatnral
plane.activlty on the plane ot the supernatural is eminently
sui table to human nature.

J.zJ.7 ldeal of lite whioh purports to

alm at the full development at human lite oannot overlook the
superna tural potency ot
selt.

human

nature and stl1l be true to 1t-
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Christi&aity tekohea eleY&tion to the supernatural
order in

~ust

this sense.

It demonstrates from man's very

nature his potency for such eleT8.tion.
elevation is a free gift

o~

It teaches that this

God, given through Christ, and

maintains that the tull human life must,&ocordingly,include
~pernatural

activity, as exercised in grace by faith.

Christ

is not to be received or reJected as the individual may see
fi t • !he new li f'e He brings i. not man' s to refuse Wi th im...
punity.

H1s happiness lies in a ready &Qd complete acceptanoe

of' it.
We may venture on these grounds to draw the f'inal conclus1on.

Since Christ oame to earth, only the Christian

Humanist10 ideal can claim to achieve the essential aim of' all
humanisa: the

~ll

and proportionate development, beoause 1t

alone takes account of the new lif'e whioh Christ willS

that

man shall live.
II
It would be unwise to be dogmat10 about the relation
in wh10h the literary and eth1oa.l opinions of Babbitt, Plato
and Longhaye stand to eaoh other, ao our di suasion will be
confined to tracing obJective Gonnections between than, for
the mo st part . oonnections pointed out by the authora themselves.

But this is really a distinot advantage, for it save.

us useless conJecture and keeps us always on the sate ground

-
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of the author's own worda.

....

Babbitt

Babbitt's opinion that the oonneotion between art (and
of oourse literary art) and morality is immediate and neoesaa
is olearly expressed in this sentenoe from Rousseau and Romant10i"; ftEither that is beautiful which appearJso to the right
kind of man, the man whose view of life is oorrect, or there
is no beauty.-

Beauty under some aspect or other is the obJect

of literature, as of all art, but beauty itself must be interpreted in ethical terms.

Beauty is in some way a relation-

ship between man's soul and a oertain quality of reality.

In

order that this relation be true its terms must be oorreot;
man. for his part, must have a oorreot view of reality as a
whol~and

of his position in the world,before he can pronounce

upon beauty either concretely or in the abstraot.
The history of man's spirit both in philosophy and in
art seems to Babbitt to be the reoord of an almost continual
osoillation between monistio extremes.

Reality appears to

man as a oneness whioh is alays ohanging, a living tissue
woven of' the one and many, of motion and repose.

So closely

intertwined are these threads ot reality that only by a oonstant and prolonged effort oan man disengage them. and even
then but imperfeotly.
indolenoe of spirit

And he, weighed down by some conna tum1
has

save at rare intervals. refused to
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make this effort and sought refuge from this toil

i~

some

snperfioial half truth, some reduotion of this living, composite reality to one or the other of its oomponents, whioh of
themselves are dead ani meaningless.

~

false and foolish trus

in his own intelleot has led him to think that by a simple
prooess, (so stmple he might have suspected it from the

tirst~

he could abstract trom manitold real1ty the eternal essences
ot things,and enoompasssin a narrow tormula,truth in its entirety.

~t

other times his indolenoe has led him to deny that

there is any unity or purpose, any oneness, in reality at all,
beoause it is so d1fficul t to peroei ve.

Man has oonsistently

refused to see, beoause to maintain this position demands constant ettort and selt disoipline, that for him either extreme
is untrue.

Man has some peroeption ot the unity of reality,

but only through the veil of illusion thrown about it by the
multiplioity and movement of experienoe.

This element ot il-

lusion is essential to man's intellectual life.

Intellect-

ualism bas led him to moral tormalism, the casuistry ot divines.

Naturalism, the philosophy of the flux, has leveled ot

the distinotion between man and the physioal world and has
identitied the law ot his lite w1 th the law ot the physioal
uni verse.

Only the recognition of the true, though limited,

tield ot his 'knowledge can reotity these errors and put man on
the road to human. right l1ving.

While his mind is essentiall

bound to exper1ence ot the many, man yet has an intuitive>

-

14.1

though part1al, pereeption

o~

a.nd law within the

!hough he oannot look up all truth

in his

~ormula.c.,

~lux.

the oneness, the unity, purpose

neither can he d1spense wi th these, for they

embody his intuitions of the one.

The w1se man w111 see that

the solution lies in the vital fUs10n of the one and the many.
He must make a right use of 111usion to help him to l1ve purpos1vely, humanely.

He w1ll have standards, but they will be

vi tal and flex1bla, oapable of expanding and conforming to
fUrther reaches and new aspeots of reality as these are reveal
ed.

!he oonduot of life by flexible standards alone is human,

and free, in a degree, from the tyranny of illusion because 1t
makes the r1ght use of 111us10n.
for

Babbit~

In ethioal terms this means,

that the expansive tendenoies of man's nature will

be restrained and direoted by the power of. control wh10h
operates acoord1ng to flexible,vital,moral laws framed on the
experience of the past. l
~he

h1story of

lite~ry

art has seen the same osc1lla-

tion between mon1st10 extremes; the same 111usory reduction of
all artistic reality to some

~alse

unity.

pseudo-classic1sm.

the child of false intellectualism, placed the whole of beauty
in form, and then fell into the egreg10us errox;i:;;formalism.
Form came to mean not living control in art,but wooden imitation by rule.

Romantic1sm, at its core a revolt against

pseudo-olassic formalism, rushed to the other extreme and deolared that all beauty is express10n, the unrestrained irres-

istible outpouring of vital personal emotion.

Again the
ist will see that ~ch extremes are ~alse and unhuman. 2
To the humanist, Babbit
oomposed

o~

expla1nS~beauty

two elements, torm and expression.

is essentially
Expression is

the expansive/vital element, torm the limiting/circumscr1bing
element.
wooden

But he does not understand form to mean a stolid,

~rame-work

is forced.

1nto whioh the vital element of express10n

Just as 1n the true humanist10 ethics the

of conduct must be olear, yet flex1 ble, so the formal element
of beauty 1s flexible and vital beoause tounded,not on mere
rule and outer authority, but upon intuit10n of oneness in exper1enoe. 3
~he

conduct of l1fe on a humanist10 plane must ot

course preoede the creation ot a humanist10 art, beoause art
is the oonsequent and express10n and, not the prime determinant,
o~

a v1ew and mode of l1fe.

A oorrect not1on of beauty is

born only ot a correct eth10al view of

l1~e.

v1ew of

oonoept10no~

l1~e

will lead to a human1stic

!he humanistic
beauty

and its embod1ment in art, & view of life and art of wh1ch the
essent1al charaoter1st1c will be select1ve oontrol aocord1ng
to vital and flex1ble law baBel upon 1ntuition of the onenesa,
uni ty, and purpose behind the

nux

o~

experienoe.
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Plato

Plato occnpies a'unique position'in the history of
oritic1sm as the first or1t10 to raise, formally, the question
of the relation between art and mora11ty_

~his

oonoern With

the ethical aspeot of oritic1sm 1s quite what we m1ght expeot.
1n view of the eth1cal preoconpation of all his thought_

His

general v1ew of this relationsh1p, too, is qu1te what we m1ght
expeot)far in oommon with all the anc1ent or1tios he holds
that art should adhere striotly to the requ1rements of mora11
As Father Longhaye expresses it, the ano1ents would bave blush
ad at the thought of the "art for art's sake" of our day_

But

ne1ther the preoccupation of Plato's thought w1th the eth10al
aspeot of things,nor the general att1tu4e of the anoients
toward the relat10n between art and

mora11t~

Will _xpla1n the

sharp antogonism wh10h pn ethioal grounds ,lato displays,
toward the im1tative arts in the tenth book of the Republio.'
After delineating at length the ideal oharaoter of the
"ph11osopher'~an4

d1soussing the peouliar perfeotion embodied 1n

th1s ideal,Plato reverts abruptly to the quest10n of the
tative art..

1mi~

!he top10 had already been touohed upon in an

ear11er book where all but patr1ot10 and sacred hymns had been
forbidden in the 1deal state.

1I0w Pl-ato aeems eager to bring

forward in support of th1s raJeot1en the evidenoe whloh furtlar discusslon has revealed.

At the opening of the book

14:4

socrates says:
·Of the many excellenoes which I perceive in
the order of our state t}:are is none which/upon
reflection,~ses me better than the rule about
poetry.
To what do you refer?
To the reJection ot imitative poetry which
oertainly ought not to be received, as I see
far more clearly now that the parts of the soul
haTe been distinguished."5
!he relation between imitative poetry and the parts of the
soul may be diffioult to see at first. but When we recall Just
how important a role these ·parts" of the soul play in Plato's
ethioal ideal. light begins to dawn.
Plato distinguish.. three parts of the soul. the oonoupisoent, the spirited and the rational.

Eaoh of these is

striving oonstantly to attain the good proper to itself - the
oonoupisoent element for all the satisfaotion of sense, the
spirit for the benefits of power and glory, reason for truth
and reality.

ultimatel~

for the Idea of Good.

But it i8 im-

possible that eaoh of these elements should be satisfied indisoriminately. for it is olear from every man's experienoe
that reason frequently opposes the desires

of the senses and

the spirited element, if unrestrained, oftenpreoipates a man
into action. he lives to regret as foolhardy.

If peace is to

reign in the soul one must regulate the satisfaotion of eaoh
part by the good of the whole.

Sense and spirit are blindly

impelled by nature toward a good whioh is only partial, oapab~

only ot satisfying the desires peculiar to eaoh.

Only

reason 8ees olearly and 'e81reB the true and comple"e goot
wh1Gh inoludes in itselt. &s what i8 perteot always inoludes.
the pertection of the les8 perfeot. the partial goods which
sense and

~irit

seek. reason alone, oonsequently, is able to

perceive and seek the good ot the whole man.

To it then should

be given the supremaoy over the powers of the soul to regulate
and provlde for the satlstaotion ot eaoh one only in acoord
Wi th the greater good of the whole man.

Upon the maintenanoe

of thls supremacy· Will depend the peace and order and perfeotion of the whole man, and this supremaoy, in turn,is understood to rest strictly upon the power of reason to know and
deslre the true good of the whole man.

Imitative ,poetry.

Plato charges, makes direotly for the disruptlon of this order
in the soul beoause it distraots reason trom the pursuit ot
its proper goodandbeoause its inordinate appeal to the senses
and the splrited element tends to strengthen these powers at
the cost ot the sapremacy of reason.
!he iml tative arts, and., of course. poetry among them,
prevent reason from attainlng to truth and reallty, that is,
to tbeknowledge of the universal ·ideas· because they conoern
themselves entirely with the
multiple.

rea~

of theindiv1dual and

God, the maker ot all things, Plato maintains;made

only the true and universal reality: of each kind of thing in
the world.

These are the "ideas·, the universa1 an! eternal

realities whlch alone are·true and pertect.

The individuals

14&
wh1ch exist 1n the world ot sense are but 1m1 tat10ns

ot

these

un1versa1 rea11t1es and. have truth and rea11ty only 1s so tar
as they imitate and reproduoe in themselves the perfection of
the 1deas.

And to these 1nd1v1duals,consequently, we do not'

ascribe the fulness of reality and perfect10n wh1ch we predicate of the ideas, but quite correotly speak of them as imi tations, appearanoes)or reflections.
obJect

o~

The individual is the

sense, the idea the object of the 1ntellect.

The

imitative arts are concerned entirely with the 1nd1vidual.
They treat and reproduoe, not the eternal and universal reality

ot any obJect)but only an indiv1dual, a bed or a man or any
other 1nd1vidual thing.

And turther J,because of the1r med1a"

they are incapable of grasping" even the tota11ty of the 1nd1v1dual.

They grasp at best only an aspect ot the ind1v1dual,

an angle ot a part1cular bed, or th1s man as he weeps or
laughs, and never the totality and the perteotion ot the 1ndiv1dual

&S

it ought to be aocord1ng to 1 ts eternal pattern.

Therefore the products of art can rightfully claim to be no
more than imitat10ns ot an aspeot of an ind1v1dual, essentially
three removes from truth and reality in the1r fulness.
Now all this m1ght be condoned 1f the 1m1tat1ve arts
would reoognize their 11mitations.
On the

contrar~

But this they do not do.

they pretend to represent reality, and men are

asked to aooept their produots a8 authentio representat10ns ,ot

1_t1'11 th.

But 1 t 1 s ma4De ss to do

80

and 1f ... m&n 1s ent10ed by
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their pretentions he will forfeit any hope of attaining by the
exercise of reason to the knowledge of the "ideas".

And with

this he will lose all hope of attaining to the perfection of
his nature, for

in giving himself over to the allurements

of art he foresakes the only guide whioh can lead him to that
perfeotion, reason,
The imitative arts are further guilty of destroying
the poise and order of the soul by their inordinate appeal to
the senses.

The order of the soul depends upon the proper

subordination of the senses to reason.

The imitative arts,

because they are oonoerned entirely with individuals, appeal
only to the senses and to the spirited element of the soul.
They put forth their produots as souraes of satisfaation to
the. sight and hearing and the emotions without making any
appeal to the
~uite

r~ason

to justify and approve this satisfaction.

the oontrary, art asks us to put our reason in abeyanoe,

as it were, for the spaoe of time in which we take our pleasure in its works, for it asks us to enjoy its products as
realities, although reason is loud in its protest.

And in

thus appealing to the senses. and to the emotions in open defianoe of reason the imitative arts tend to strengthen the power
of the former at the oost of the latter and prepare the way
for disorder in the soul.

All that has been said applies with

especial forae to poetry whioh is the greatest and most powerful of the arts.
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rhus Platots opposition to poetry springs directly
trom zeal tor his ethical

1deal~

Poetry threatens the very

foundations of this ideal--the supremacy ot reason among the
powers of the soul

in virtue of its knowledge of reality,

ultimately ot the Idea ot Good.

We must not of course over-

look the tact that Plato seems to have utterly misunderstood
the true creative processes of art, which are, in their ways
aPmuch universalizing processes as the activity of reason.
But this oonsideration opens a question beyond our present
scope.

For Plato, poetry is anathema because, as far as he

can see, it can not coexist with the

athical ideal which

alone, he thinks, can insure men's happiness.

And so he ex-

iles poetry from his perfect state, because truth is greater
than any man.

But he exiles her with great reluctance and

concludes the matter with the sad out eager words, ftShall I
propose that she be allowed to return from exile on the condition that she make defense of herself?ft

And he lets us feel

that)in the event of a successful apologYthe will be among
those eager to welcome her into the ideal City.

c.

Longhay~

The worth of the ethical interpretation of literature
for the purposes of criticism is often impugned on the grounds
that to Judge literature ethioally is to force upon it norms
of perfection altogether alien to its intrinSiC nature and its

1.'
proper end.

!he great ant only concern is beauty. it is ar-

gued, and the essenoe ot beauty is pleasure.

These are the

only legitimate norms ·of literary excellence, beauty and pleasure • •oral r1ght and wrong are simply' beside the paint in
the Judgment of literature.
author1 ty in the f1eld.

!his view is held by men of great

But critics of no 18 [cOS merit have

taken their stand upon the shioal interpretation as the only
logioal baSis for truitful oritioism. and among these Father
Longbaye must be numbered.

It is his counter-complaint,

against those who oppose the ethioal oritioism,tb&t they do
no~

examine the whole question deeply enough.

An examination of the history of literature reveals
that literature, as all art, is essentially the produot ot
man a8 a moral being.

The su.bJect-matter of works ot

literature acknowledged commonly to be the world's masterpieoes is almost without exoeption some aspeot of man's moral
lite.

!he epios of Homer, the tragedie.

of

Sophooles and

Euripides, the tale of ttpius Aeneas", the Divine Comedy, the
great plays of Shakespeare, the work of the nineteenth
century in Fran.e, England and other European countries
and oontemporary literature in general bear eloquent witness
to the common preoccupation of the art with the vital
que.tions.

mo~l

If Homer was appealed to as the ethical monitor

of Greece, it was because the Sreeks recognized that the

poet~

ohiet oonoern was an ideal of right living and not mere plea-
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sure..

!he ul time. te motive whioh enabled Dante to undertake

and oomplete his tremen4OU8 task ot oomposing the "poerna sa ora "
was the oonviotion that he possessed vital moral thth to
impart

and

that literature was the, best ohannel tor its popular

1

oorrmunioation.

And whooan fail to see that muoh ot modern

literature by its very tlaunted amoral charaoter is but ottering another answer to the great persistant moral question?
Moreover. the taot that the great poets and dramatists have
most frequently avowed their moral aims cannot be overlooked.
Euripides and Sophooles, Virgil and Dante openly aftirm their
moral purpose.

!rb.e writers ot the nineteenth oentury who

were seeking a substitute tor religion either in literature
and art or 1n innumerable other
ad.mi tted their purpose.

soul-nostrums frankly

And in our own day, oould Eugene

O'Neill, tor instance, deny it?

If he did, he oould plead no

valid reason tor a line he has lITi tten.

It may truthtully be

said that every great literary artist has sought by his writing to influenoe the moral 'ideas and ideals ot his oontemporaries and ot posterity.

How is it legitimate to set aside

the moral oonsiderations ot their work as the illusions of
graat men, dissipated by modern oritioal thought, as Benedetto
Crooe would bave us do?

If we are truly to

~udge

the men, we

mUst take their work as they wanted it to be taken.
With these taots before him the literary oritio will
hesitate to exolude moral considerations tram his Judgments.
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If he does exclude them he will find himself vaporiz1D.g" a.D4
not oritioizing, for he Will have lost vital contaot With his
subJect.

It is evident that Father Longhaye realized the

weight of the historical evidenoe from his V3ry definition of

,

literatare, which he oalls, ttl'art de exercer sur l'honooe par
;

la parole une aotion moral, pUissante et ordonee."

But his-

torical evidence appears to him more oorroborative than fundamental.

An analysis of speech. written or spoken, will lead

to the same conolusion, he maintains.

Conoeptual language is

distinctive of man anddireotly indioative of the presenoe in
him of intelleot, indioative therefore of his soul.

It is the

soul of man that seeks expression through language, the saul
of man whioh is made for union with a body" whioh seeks .intimate expression of itself in literature.

And the ahief,

rather the onlyJreal ooncern of man's soul. is its destiny.
Which is a moral issue/obviously.

Though the powers of the

soul may be 'turned to other purposes, their real end is to
know and will

~'s

true happiness.

When, as happens in lit-

erature, the soul expresses itself intimately and sinoerely,
it is impossible that it should not speak of that whioh aonoems it so constantly and so alosely.

Or, is it conoeivable

that in this intimate revelation of itself the saul should
put aside

~is

all engrossing interest to give itself over to

the mere delight of the moment?
Li tera w.re, as all

0 the r

Who can sinoerely believe so?

interests am aoti vi ties of the human
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soul. is naturally subordinate to that one sapreme interest,
the last end ot man, and to its only important aotivity, the
attainment of that end.

The oonoeption

o~

a literature eman-

oipated from the oommon servioe to the last end is unhuman,
unnatural and suioidal.
But what is the purpose of this intimate self revelation of the soul?
soul?

Is it simply to relieve the burden of the

Oooasionally this may be true, but this would hardly

explain man's continued effort at literary expression.

The

soul wishes by this expression to oommunioate itself to other
souls, to share with them its reflexions and to stir them up
to sympathy with its own afreotions.

It seeks to arouse

essentially moral aotivity in the recipient of its expreSSion.
that is. activity of the distinctive powers of the soul.

To

this end it bends all its powers, shapes all its means and
methods.

Literary history is naturally in this light the

record of souls who seek to move the souls of others and to
mold the subtle and beautiful instrument of language to this
end.

But why, it may ue asked, should this expression take on

so elaborate a form?

Why does not intellectual soul speak to

intellectual soul by reasoned thought alone?
that the intellectual soul is not the man.

The answer is
Though the intel-

leotual prinoiple is the chief constituent of man. the body is
also essential to human natureJand in our present state the
aotivity of the intelleot is in a sense conditioned by the
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ministrations of the body.

The soul which seeks to communioate

itself to other souls knows that its message must pass through
the hands of this minister.

She speaks therefore not merely

abstraotions and universals but language which will attract
and arrest sense and emotion also, reaching the higher by the
lower.

Sometimes the intelleot does express itselt in mere

abstraotions, but then it is not expressing its intimate self.
Suoh expression is not literature but the symbolism of impersonal sCienoe.
Thus, philosophy and history join torces to support
Father Longhaye's conception of literature: "l'art
~

d'exercer

l'homme par la parole une action moral, puissante et
I

ordonnee. ft

Further analysis of the constitution of man will

explain the presence of the last words: "(action) puissante et
ordonn~e,"

and will enable us to see the genesis and force

of the chief laws of literary expression according to Father
Longhaye: power and order.
It is obvious that in order to achieve the end of selfexpression, namely, to move other souls to sympathy with itself the. soul must use powerful means.

Language is its dis-

tinctive and only immediate and unequivocal medium of expression.

Consequently it must make this instrument as powerful

as possible by adapting it completely to the exigenoies of expression, that is to the nature ot both recipient and topic,
as well as to particular ciraumstanoes.

Above all, it should

1M

try to leave no pOint ot ingress to the other soul unattacked.
If expression fails in this completeness of its appeal, all
other precautions for its success will be futile.

Sense, the

emotion, intellect are all, so to speak, legitimate prey to
the invading foroe.

If this force is stopped at the very out-

posts by failing to effeot the capitnlation of the senses, it
can never hope to gain the citadel.

And if after passing the

outworks it oannot pass the inner fortifications of sensibility
its effort has been in vain.

The oondition of power of appeal

is then a frontal attaok on the reoipient soul at every vantage
point, sense, emotion

a~

intelleot.

Thus only will the day

be oarried and soul be made to sympathize with soul.
Yet mere power of appeal is not suffioent, and in the
advioe to appeal to the whole man there lurks a great danger.
Besides power, order is required to make the appeal to the
soul effective and legitimate. Man is indeed body and soul,
but the soul is vastly superior to the body.

It not only

reoeives the data of sense, but also passes judgment on them
and rules her aotion in acoord with her judgment.

In order;

then, to move the soul to aotion, the appeal to emotion and
sense must not outweigh the appeal to intelleot proper, but
should be proportionate to it and seleoted with attention to
its appropriateness in the oiroumstances.

Unless this is so,

the soul will be repelled rather than attracted and rendered
sympathetio.

She will rightly judge indisoriminate and ex-
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travagant appeal to be meaningless and will not respond.

The

powerfUL appeal must then be ordered, seeking the aid, and not
the interferenoe, of the body.

The appeal to the senses and

emotion will be so moderated that the intelleot will always
be able

easi~y

and quiokly to perceive the message meant for

itself in t.he information brought to it.
Order is also required to make the appeal

legitimate~

The hierarchy ot taoulties in man is not IllIfrely a help, but is
the absolute oondition ot the attainment of the last end of
man.

Disorder among the faoulties is disastrous to the

attainment ot true happiness.

Inordinate appeal to the lower

powers tends to introduoe disorder by strengthening them unduely.

Consequently it is not legitimate to appeal to the., in

literary expreSSion, more than to the intelleot.

But, it may

be objeoted, the soul ot the artist has the right to use every
means it oan to gain its end.

Hardly.

No man has the right

tointroduoe suoh disastrous disorder into the soul of another
human being to gain sympathy there tar himself. The soul whioh
stoops to suoh means to gain its end is not deserving to be
heard.

Rather it deserves to be silenced.

And so one is

justified. in saying that only the appeal that is ordered in
acoord with the true and essential order of the soul is legitimate and alone deserves to be received with approval.

Though

no one oan prevent disordered appeals from being made, philosophioori ties will condemn them a.s nothing short of oriminal.
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Fa. ther Longba7e'. 11 terar7 creed r.rdA7 be summe' up in

his definition of literature given above and in the two great
laws of gOOd liter&tare he enunoiates.
~our exercer par 1& parole ~e aotion
pUissante il faut c1lplo;yer 'a 1& ~ois e~ constamment dans 1& parole toutls les f~cultLes
oapables d'y conoourir. ft6

ftToute. les facult~6s d&ivent agir ensemble
mais sulv&nt leur hllrarchie inve/lriable ef les
exlgencea vari&blesde leur objet commun.It is easily perceived from wbat has

bee~

said above how these

follow from the basic characteristic of Ibis ethical ldeal, '!h.
fundamental charaoteristios of his ethi.,.u. ideal., as

w.

sa-J

.ere the dualism ln man, the superiority . . of soul and the essent1&l hlerarohy of the faoul tle.'s.

Fro!- the flrst spring the

oonceptions behlnd tba deflnltlon of lit,erature ltself. from
the seoond the laws of good composltion.
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